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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case stems from Covenants, Conditions, and Restriction (hereafter: CC&R) 
violations, wherein the Respondents are; a.) operating a full time commercial business on 
their property in the Park Wood Place subdivision (hereafter: PWP), which is known as the 
River Cove Bed and Breakfast; b.) Respondents planted a row of arborvitae shrubs that form 
a hedge, which constitutes a 'fence' and is located on the property line separating the two 
parties'. The hedge continues to grow beyond the CC&R height restrictions, blocking 
Appellants protected view of the river and is a nuisance; c.) Respondents have breached a 
written contract with Appellant to maintain the arborvitae hedge at a height of six ( 6) feet; d.) 
Respondents have retaliated against Appellant by falsely accusing Appellant of multiple 
crimes (Appellant was arrested and charged with a felony), spitefully planting additional 
arborvitae shrubs and trees to block Appellants view of the river, and causing extreme 
emotional distress to Appellant. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On September 23, 2010, Appellant Christina J. Greenfield filed a civil action against the 
above-mentioned Respondents in Kootenai County District Court seeking injunctive relief 
and damages as listed; 
1.) that the Court enter an Order declaring that the Respondents operation of the Bed and 
Breakfast in PWP is in violation of the CC&Rs; 
2.) that the Court enter an Injunction prohibiting the Respondents from operating the Bed and 
Breakfast, or any similar business in the Park Wood Place subdivision; 
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3.) that the Court enter an Order Declaring that the arborvitae hedge as described herein 
constitutes a fence and the Respondents are to maintain the arborvitae hedge, which 
continues to violate the PWP CC&Rs height restrictions on fences; 
4.) that the Court enter an Order declaring that the easement be cleared of all obstructions; 
5.) that the Court award Appellant a judgment against the Respondents for Nuisance; 
6.) that the Court enter an Order for Abatement requiring the Respondents to remove any and 
all shrubs and trees located at or near the parties common property line that were planted 
out of "spite", which block the Appellant's view of the river, obstruct the Appellant's free 
use of property, and interfere with the Appellant's comfortable enjoyment of life and 
property; 
7.) that the Court enter an Injunction prohibiting the Respondents from planting any shrubs 
or other vegetation at or near the common boundary line between the parties' real 
property, which blocks the Appellant's long standing view of the Spokane River and 
obstructing the Appellant's free use of her property, and interferes with the Appellant's 
comfortable enjoyment of life and property; 
8.) that the Court award the Appellant a judgment against the Respondents for Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress; 
9.) that the Court award the Appellant a judgment against the Respondents for Negligent 
Infliction of Emotional Distress; 
10. that the Court award Appellant post-judgment interest on any judgment; 
11. that the Court award Appellant her reasonable attorney fees; 
12. that the Court award Appellant further relief as the Court deems to be just and equitable 
under the circumstances. 
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On May 24, 2012, Judge Lansing Haynes granted Appellant all motions on summary 
judgment, except for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. After numerous delays by the 
Respondents, a five day Jury Trial began on November 26, 2012. 
On December 10, 2012, Appellant filed a J.N.O.V. Motion to overturn the jury's verdict, as 
a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50. The Court DENIED Appellant's 
J.N.O.V. on March 21, 2013. The district court DENIED Appellant's Motion to Reconsider on 
May 2, 2013. Appellant filed her timely Notice of Appeal on June 12, 2013. The Court issued a 
Final Amended Judgment on July 8, 2013. Appellant filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on July 
24, 2013. Appellant now submits this brief in support of her appeal. 
C. Statement of the Facts 
1.) The Respondents are intentionally and / or recklessly unlawfully operating a full time, 
year round commercial business that is open to the public, upon their real property, which 
is named the "River Cove Bed and Breakfast." The business offers several overnight 
accommodations and a wedding facility via internet advertising, and other marketing 
sources. Said commercial business is "PROHIBITED" under the PWP CC&Rs. 
2.) The Respondents have planted an arborvitae shrub hedge in a single row upon or near the 
property line between parties' real property, which constitutes a "FENCE." The 
arborvitae hedge continues to grow and violate the height restriction for fences as 
permitted by the PWP CC&Rs. 
3.) Respondents have planted nine (9) additional arborvitae shrubs to existing hedge of 
twenty-four (24) arborvitae and several large growing trees upon their real property, after 
Appellant exercised her legal right to enforce the PWP CC&Rs. Said spite plantings 
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obstruct and infringe upon the Appellant's real property blocking her coveted view of the 
river, the free use of her property and the comfortable enjoyment oflife and property. 
4.) Respondents entered into an agreement with the Appellant to maintain the arborvitae 
hedge at the agreed upon height of six ( 6) feet in May 2006. Respondents breached said 
agreement by allowing the arborvitae fence to grow to a height in excess of six (6) feet. 
5.) Respondents have engaged in a retaliatory course of conduct to harass the Appellant by 
planting spite shrubs and trees, installing surveillance cameras that face the Appellant's 
property, intentionally and recklessly making false allegations to local law enforcement 
about the Appellant, and manufacturing defamatory statements about the Appellant to 
news sources. One allegation resulted in the Appellant being arrested and charged with a 
Felony, which she was eventually acquitted of nineteen (19) months later. 
6.) Due to the intentional and/ or negligent actions of the Respondents as set forth above, the 
Appellant suffers from severe physical manifestations and emotional distress. 
II. ISSUES 
a) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Respondents' operation of their business, 
the River Cove Bed and Breakfast and wedding event facility did not violate the 
neighborhood CC&Rs? 
b) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Respondents' operation of their business, 
the River Cove Bed and Breakfast and wedding event facility was "Not open to the 
public"? 
c) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Respondents' operation of their business, 
the River Cove Bed and Breakfast and wedding event facility, qualifies as a "Home 
Occupation" and not a "Business" as so defined in the neighborhood CC&Rs? 
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d) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Respondents' lack of maintenance of the 
arborvitae hedge, which is located on or near the real property line that separates both 
properties, did not violate the neighborhood CC&Rs height restrictions and therefore 
refuse to enter an Injunction prohibiting the Respondents' from allowing the arborvitae 
shrubs to exceed the height restrictions as set forth in the neighborhood CC&Rs? 
e) Did the District Court err in its finding that the arborvitae shrubs that form a hedge did 
not constitute a "Fence"? 
f) Did the District Court err in its finding that the arborvitae shrubs that form a hedge, as 
mentioned above, are to be considered trees? 
g) Did the District Court err in its finding that the arborvitae hedge is solely located on the 
Respondents' property when a mutual ownership was evident on both surveys? 
h) Did the District Court err in its finding that Appellant should be accused and assessed 
damages for intentionally and willfully committed Timber Trespass to the property of 
Respondents wherein LC. § 6-202 allowing for treble damages would have applied when 
a dual ownership of the arborvitae (shrub) hedge, which is located on or near the 
adjoining property line of both the Appellant and Respondents, is evident? 
i) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Appellant should be assessed "Timber" 
damages for property ( arborvitae hedge) that she equally owns, after the Appellant 
trimmed said arborvitae hedge to the agreed upon height, which was previously cut four 
years prior to the same height by the Respondent at which time it was neither damaged or 
destroyed? 
j) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Appellant has intentionally, willfully or 
negligently damaged and/ or destroyed the ten (10) arborvitae shrubs in question? 
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k) Did the District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes err in his finding that the 
Respondents' asserted legal claims for "Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress" 
during the trial were properly disclosed, when in fact, the District Court Honorable Judge 
Lansing Haynes had previously dismissed the Respondents' original claim of Negligent 
Infliction of Emotional Distress on March 22, 2011 with Prejudice? 
1) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Respondents' violation of the 
neighborhood CC&Rs by operating a business, the River Cove Bed and Breakfast and 
wedding event facility, and the arrest of the Appellant after trimming said arborvitae 
hedge, along with constant harassment, including many false allegations of crimes 
reported by the Respondents, did not cause extreme negligent emotional distress on the 
Appellant? 
m) Did the District Court err in its finding that the jury instructions and the special verdict 
form were properly amended and submitted within the time frame as specified under 
I.R.C.P. 51(a)(l)? 
n) Did the District Court err in its finding that the Respondents' Survey was properly signed 
and introduced into evidence? 
o) Did the District Court err in its finding that Respondents' did not purposely and or 
negligently plant large trees and or shrubs to intentionally block Appellant's view of the 
Spokane River, which infringes upon Appellant's real property, obstructs her free use of 
property and interferes with her comfortable enjoyment of life and property? 
p) Did the District Court err in its finding that the large trees and or shrubs that were planted 
intentionally to block Appellant's granted view of the Spokane River, which infringes 
upon Appellant's real property, obstructs her free use of property, and interferes with her 
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comfortable enjoyment of life and property, should be abated by the Respondents' and 
ordered an injunction prohibiting future obstructions of Appellant's view of the Spokane 
River, and not interfere with her comfortable enjoyment oflife and property? 
q) Did the District Court err in denying Appellant's invocation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment right to Due Process, which prohibits state and local governments from 
depriving persons of life, liberty, or property without certain steps being taken to ensure 
fairness and to recognize her substantive and procedural rights? 
r) Did the District Court err in allowing excessive awards of damages and attorney fees to 
the Respondents'? 
s) Did the District Court err in determining whether damages were correctly assessed in 
accordance with the finding for and the allowable amount of awards of damages and 
attorney fees to the Respondents? 
t) Did the District Court err by depriving Appellant her rights by violating 42 USC § 1983 -
Civil action for deprivation of rights and due process? 
u) Did the District Court Judge Lansing Haynes express an "appearance of partiality" 
against Greenfield during the proceedings? 
v) Did the District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes err by not disqualifying himself, 
as well as his law clerk, Schuyler A. Pennington, from the court proceedings do to their 
affiliation with the Knights Of Columbus, an inclusive Catholic organization of men, 
wherein Eric Wurmlinger is also affiliated with such organization, therefore causing 
prejudicial bias within the judicial outcome of the case? 
w) Did the District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes err by allowing the Defendants 
'Unclean hands' to mislead the trial court into believing that certain Trial Exhibits were 
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factual, wherein said exhibits were submitted "Incomplete" or contained "Unacceptable" 
information? 
x) Did the District Court base its findings upon unsubstantiated and incompetent evidence 
from the Respondents', and did that evidence support the district courts conclusions of 
law wherein the Appellant was prejudiced by said evidence? 
y) Did the District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes err by giving the jury improper 
instructions? 
z) Did the District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes err by failure to Order an 
Abatement requiring the Respondents' to remove any and all shrubs and trees located at 
or near the parties common property line which obstruct the Appellant's free use of 
property, and interferes with the Appellant's comfortable enjoyment oflife and property? 
aa) Did the District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes err by failure to Enter an 
Injunction prohibiting the Respondents' from planting any trees, shrubs, or other 
vegetation which blocks the Appellant's view of the Spokane River or otherwise obstructs 
the Appellant's free use of property, and interferes with the Appellant's comfortable 
enjoyment of life and property? 
bb) Did the District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes commit Fraud Upon the Court as 
witnessed and verified by the Appellant on December 30, 2013, after Appellant viewed 
her case file, wherein the Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes commented in his case file 
notes "The only issue that concerns me is the N.I.E.D. (Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress) claim being dismissed ... We can play up the former counsel's decision and the 
no objection to putting it to the jury later on" wherein Judge Haynes openly admits by 
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acknowledging concerns and states "We can Play up ... " the N.I.E.D. claim that Judge 
Haynes had dismissed with prejudice a year and a half prior to trial? 
III.ARGUMENT 
DUE TO RELATIVELY LENGTHY AMOUNT OF ISSUES IN THIS CASE, 
APPELLANT IS CONSOLIDATING ISSUES BY SUBJECT MATTER 
A. Consolidating Issues (a)(b)(c) CC&R Violations for Respondents Business 
Respondents, Eric and Rosalyn Wurmlinger entered into a contractual agreement 
in 1994, when they purchased their property in a Post Falls subdivision known as Park 
Wood Place (PWP), which is zoned as single family residential. 
The PWP lots are governed by covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs) 
(See Appellant's Trial Exhibit #1, CC&Rs, Pg. 1, ARTICLE I "Land Use" #1 Residential 
Purposes, Pg. 2, ARTICLE II "Building Restrictions" # 1 Architectural Control 
Committee, Pg. 3, Paragraph 2), which limits the use of said lots for residential purposes. 
The PWP CCRs contain a broader prohibition that prevents the owners from operating a 
business on their property; Paragraph #1 states "No lot shall be used except for residential 
purposes." Respondent Eric Wurmlinger testified to his knowledge of the PWP CC&R 
business prohibition, yet Respondents constructed their home to accommodate the bed 
and breakfast commercial venture (See Trial Testimony Eric Wurmlinger, Pg. 216, Lines 
18-25, Pg. 217, Lines 1-5, Pg. 219, Lines 3-8, Lines 11-25, Pg. 220, Lines 1-4, Pg. 221, 
Lines 11-13, Pg. 223, Lines 5-25, Pg. 224, lines 1-2, Pg. 225, Lines 6-13, Pg. 226, 9-14, 
Pg. 232, Lines 17-19, Pg. 236, Lines 20-25, Pg. 243, Lines 5-6, Lines 12-25, Pg. 249, 
Lines 4-8, Pg. 252, Lines 8-11, Pg. 253, Lines 5-6, Lines 21-25, Pg. 254, Lines 14-15, 
Line 23, Pg. 255. Line 3, Pg. 261, Lines 7-18, Pg. 262, Lines 7-10, Pg. 280, Lines 18-25, 
Pg. 281, Lines 8-18, Pg. 282, Lines 1-12, Pg. 283, Lines 7-18, Line 21-22, Pg. 349, Lines 
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9-11, Lines 18-23). See Atwood; "The CC&Rs specifically prohibit the use of such lots 
for any businesses." 
The PWP CC&Rs may be amended by a 75% or more vote from the PWP 
property owners (See Appellants Trial Exhibit #1, CC&Rs, Pg. 6, ARTICLE III "General 
Provisions" #4 Amendments). To date, no amendment has successfully been adopted to 
allow any businesses to operate in the PWP subdivision. 
The Respondents promote their commercial business by advertising on their 
website and with on-line booking agencies, wherein the public can view and purchase 
overnight accommodations and wedding packages (See Appellants Trial Exhibit #2, 
Coeur d'Alene Bed & Brealifast Association Internet Advertisements for the River Cove B 
& B Accommodations and a Wedding Venue for up to 25 people and Trial Exhibit #26, 
The River Cove B & B Internet Advertisement for a Wedding Venue for up to 40 people). 
The Respondents have advertised in highly visible newspapers of their "open to the 
public events" as well as local tourist venues (See Appellants Trial Exhibit #54, The 
Spokesman Review Newspaper Article Advertising "Open-House" event "open to the 
public"). The River Cove Bed and Breakfast operates seven days a week, twelve months 
a year, patrons are allowed to park on the street, book and attend wedding events, come 
and go at all hours of the night and day, and utilize the outdoor hot tub facility, as well as 
other amenities (paddle boat and yacht) that are advertised on Respondents commercial 
business website (See Clerks Record: Pg. 509, List of "Booking Sites" for River Cove 
Bed and Breaifast and Trial testimony of Eric Wurmlinger, Pg. 235, Lines 4-16). 
This Court has repeatedly found restrictive covenants valid and enforceable, 
which clearly restrict the use a party may put on his or her property. See Atwood v. 
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Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 138 P. 3d 310 (2006); Pinehaven, 138 Idaho at 829, 70 P. 3d at 
667; Sun Valley Ctr. For the Arts & Humanities, Inc. v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 411, 
413, 690 P. 2d 346, 348 (1984); Brown, 129 Idaho at 192, 923 P. 2d at 437. "As a 
derogation of the common law right to use land for lawful purposes, restrictive covenants 
will not be extended by implication." Id. At 192, 923 P. 2d at 437; Birdwood, 145 Idaho 
at 20, 175 P. 3d at 182. "When restrictive covenants clearly express (as the Park Wood 
Place CC&Rs do), then the restrictions on the use of land shall be enforced." Brown 129 
Idaho at 192, 923 P. 2d at 437; Becker v. Arnfeld, 466 P.2d 479 (Colo. 1970). 
"''Where the language of the CC&Rs is clear and unambiguous, statutory 
construction is unnecessary, and this Court need only determine the application of the 
words to the facts of the case at hand. See Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Serv., 135 Idaho 
568, 571, 21 P.3d 890, 893 (2001). "A statute (CC&Rs) is ambiguous where the language 
is capable of more than one construction." Struhs v. Protection Techs. Inc., 133 Idaho 
715, 718, 992 P.2d 164, 167 (1999). "Ambiguity is not established merely because 
differing interpretations are presented to a court; otherwise, all statutes (CC&Rs) subject 
to litigation would be considered ambiguous. Hamilton, 135 Idaho at 571, 21 P. 3d at 
893. "The interpretation should begin with an examination of the literal words of the 
statute (CC&R), and this language should be given its plain, obvious, and rational 
meaning." Williamson v. City of McCall (In re Williamson), 135 Idaho 452, 455, 19 P. 
3d 766, 769 (2001). 'Farm Bureau Mut Auto. Ins. Co. v. Violano, 123 F.2d 692 (2d 
Cir. 1941), "342 P.2d at 933. "Words should be taken in that sense to which the 
apparent object and intention of the parties limit them, and the courts will always 
look behind the terminology to ascertain what the parties intended in making the 
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contract." The determination of whether a document is ambiguous is a question of law, 
over which we exercise free review. See Smith; Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., Inc., 141 Idaho 
604, 614, 114 P.3d 974, 984 (2005) (citations omitted). In evaluating for ambiguity, this 
Court will examine the relevant portions of the document "to determine whether [it] is 
reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations." Id. ( citations omitted).'"' 
It is undisputed that the CC&Rs by impressing upon all lots in PWP subdivision 
develop a uniform set of restrictive covenants, intended to establish a scheme or plan to 
insure the development is a "residential area of high standards." Said PWP lots are taxed 
at a premium rate due to their location in relationship to the river, which has resulted in a 
residential area of high standards. A commercial business detracts from said "High 
Standards" and decreases property values. 
The Respondents business attracts a large number of the public on a daily basis, 
through multiple internet advertising sites (See Appellants Trial Exhibit #26 A & B, 
Respondents Website Advertisements), which creates excessive traffic, constant noise, and 
intrusions from unwelcome patrons who stray onto adjacent properties, block driveways, 
mail boxes, and causes street congestion (PWP is situated in a cul-de-sac with one 
entrance). Said commercial business qualifies as a "Nuisance" (See Idaho Code §52-101 
and Idaho Code §52-111) to neighboring property owners who must endure the numerous 
commotions and annoyances year round. 
It is further noted that Respondent Eric Wurmlinger, during testimony, uses the 
word "Business" multiple times in referring to the River Cove Bed & Breakfast. The 
Respondents submitted a claim for 'Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic 
Advantage' referring to their commercial business, then later dismissed said claim (See 
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Clerks Record Pg. 48 and Pg. 5Q). Mr. Wunnlinger states "it started as a hobby then 
grew into a full-time job." Respondents' commercial business produces a substantial 
income compared to that of a "Hobby." (See Appellants Trial Exhibit #55, Revenue 
Reports for Respondents Business and Appellants Trial Exhibit #109 and Appellants 
Attached Exhibit # 1, Respondents Tax Records "Detail Report" for 2010). Appellant 
believes that the trial judge did not properly construe the meaning of the restrictive 
covenants under "Home Occupation". A "Home Occupation" is considered a non-
intrusive occupation that is unseen and mostly kept hidden from view from adjacent 
homeowners that does not change the appearance of the neighborhood and does not 
becomes a nuisance. 
It is obvious that the Respondents business is a highly successful commercial 
business. See Metzner v. Wojdyla, 125 Wn.2d 445 (WA 1994) 886 P. 2d 154. ""Holding 
that the Wojdylas operation of a licensed day care constituted a commercial enterprise 
and is in violation of the restrictive covenants of the neighborhood. The phrase 
"residential purposes" was interpreted by the Washington Court of Appeals in Hagemann 
v. Worth, 56 Wn. App. 85 (1989) 782 P. 2d 1 072. In holding a group home violated the 
restrictive covenant, the court noted that the term "residential" was the antonym of 
"business" and that accepting paying customers was not svnonymous with a residential 
purpose. This interpretation of "residential" was confirmed in Mains Farm Homeowners 
Association v. Worthington, 64 Wash. App. 171, 824 P.2d 495 (1992). There the covenant 
limited use to "single family residential purposes only." As in the Hagemann case, 
operation of an adult group home was at issue."" The court focused on the business 
nature of the enterprise and held it violated the restrictive covenant. '"'Respondent's use 
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includes a commercial element because she receives payment for the care that she gives 
unrelated adults in her home. The single-family residential nature of respondent's use of 
her home is destroyed by the elements of commercialism ... " It is beyond question that 
the Wojdylas are indeed operating a business. Like the state-licensed adult facilities in 
Hagemann and Mains Farm, the child day care center operated by the Wojdylas accepts 
money in exchange for the care of persons (in this instance, children) not related to them. 
It is also licensed by the State and considered an "agency" under state law."" (See 
Appellants Trial Exhibit #88, Idaho Business License for Respondents Business). 
Appellant further argues that the Respondents are aware that the City of Post Falls 
Zoning Ordinance requires that a bed & breakfast business owner must obtain a "Special 
Use" Permit to operate a commercial venture in a residential zoned neighborhood. The 
Respondents DO NOT have a "Special Use" permit; they operate under a "Home 
Occupation" permit. Not only are the Respondents violating the PWP CC&Rs (See 
Appellants Trial Exhibit #1, PWP CC&Rs, ARTICLE I "Land Use", #1 Residential 
Purposes l:.g_J), they are also in violation of City of Post Falls "Home Occupation" 
Permit (See Appellants Trial Exhibit #4, Business License Application and Home 
Occupation Requirements, Pg. 3, (A) (1) (2) (3) (5) (8) (10)). Also; (See Trial Testimony 
Christina Greenfield, Pg. 515, Lines 12-15 and Appellants Trial Exhibit # 102, Photos of 
Respondents "Home Occupation" Violations). 
The Respondents attempted to modify a portion of the PWP CC&Rs (July 2011, 
after Appellant filed her Claim against the Respondents; See Appellants Trial Exhibit 
# 104) by obtaining PWP homeowner signatures that were illegally notarized by 
Respondent Rosalyn Wurmlinger, who is a Registered Notary for the State of Idaho, 
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which violates Idaho State laws for Notaries (See Idaho Code §51-108, Idaho Code §51-
112, Idaho Code §51-117, Idaho Code §51-119). 
Respondent Rosalyn Wurrnlinger is sworn under oath to uphold the provisions of 
Idaho State Code as a Notary for the State of Idaho. The signatures that Ms. Wurrnlinger 
notarized are not legally binding under the "disqualifying interest" rules, therefore 
invalidating the Instrument (See Trial Testimony of Eric Wurmlinger Pg. 374, Line 25, Pg. 
375, Lines 1-3, Lines 6-8, Pg. 380, Lines 11-15, Lines 18-25, Pg. 381, Lines 1-7, Line 11-
15, Pg. 417, Lines 2-15). 
The Respondents then attempted to utilize this nullified document as trial 
evidence (See Respondents Trial Exhibit #1) during court proceedings , which violates 
Idaho Code (See Idaho Code §18-2601 and Idaho Code §18-2602). 
B. Consolidating Issues (d)(e)(f)(aa) CC&R Fence Restrictions, 'Spite' Plantings, and 
Injunctive Relief 
Appellant purchased her property primarily for the coveted view of the river, 
which Appellant paid a premium price for said view (See Trial Testimony of Kootenai 
County Tax Assessor John Wilhelm Pg. 422, Line 18-19, Pg. 424, Lines 15-23, Pg. 425, 
Lines 2-12). The Appellants view of the river had been established in 1993 upon 
completion of the Appellant's home (one year prior to the Respondents purchase of their 
property), which Appellant purchased from the original homeowner in May 2005. 
To ensure that the property owners who bought the higher priced premium 
properties kept their views of the river, and other residential protections, an Architectural 
Control Committee was established to protect their interests by drafting and enforcing a 
Declaration of Protective Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. 
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It is mandated that all property owners within the PWP subdivision are to follow 
the CC&Rs that run with the land perpetually binding all persons who hold any right, 
title, or interest in said properties. The height restriction for PWP fences, and other like 
structures, is set at a maximum height of five (5) feet and the approval of the 
Architectural Control Committee was required before any property owner could erect any 
fence or like structure (See Appellant's Trial Exhibit #1, Park Wood Place Protective 
CC&Rs, Pg. 4, ARTICLE II "Building Restrictions", #2 Building Conditions). 
When Appellant purchased her property, she was aware that the PWP CC&Rs 
protected the coveted view of the river by certifying that adjacent property owners were 
to adhere to the five (5) foot height restrictions for fences and like structures (including 
hedges). Several of the homes that are located adjacent to the Greenfield property have 
exceptional views of the Spokane River as well, and are taxed at a higher premium. These 
homes were designed and approved by the Architectural Control Committee to avoid 
interference with the protected views of the neighboring homes. 
The Respondents were aware of the height restriction for fences (See Trial 
Testimony of Eric Wurmlinger, Pg. 296, Lines 4-6, Lines 13- 25, Pg. 297, Lines 1-4, Pg. 
299, Lines 3-11), yet Respondents willfully and intentionally allowed the 'Emerald 
Green' arborvitae hedge they planted in 1994 -1995, on the adjoining property line, to 
grow and exceed the five (5) foot PWP CC&R height requirement. In May 2006, 
Appellant hired attorney, Kacey Wall, to address the arborvitae height issue, wherein both 
parties then agreed that Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, would maintain the arborvitae 
hedge at a six (6) foot height (See Trial Testimony of Eric Wurmlinger, Pg. 326, Lines 6-8, 
Lines 16-17, Pg. 327, Lines 12-21 andAppellants TrialExhibit#16Pg. 2, #4). 
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One month after said agreement, Respondent, Eric Wurm.linger, began retaliatory 
attacks against the Appellant by planting spite shrubs and trees, which included; two (2) 
large pine trees and two (2) large deciduous trees (planted June 2006), an additional nine 
(9) arborvitae shrubs to the existing twenty-four (24) arborvitae shrubs (planted May 
2008), two (2) large Maple trees (planted September 2012), next to the parties' property 
line to completely block Appellants view of the river ((See Appellants Trial Exhibit #25 
and #102(E) (Qefore plantings) and Exhibit #13 .from Clerks Record Pg. 561 of 717 also 
Appellants Attached Exhibit #2 (afier plantings)). 
It is further noted that the Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, planted the above-
mentioned spite trees and shrubs from a period of approximately fourteen (14) to 
eighteen (18) years after the Respondents landscaping had been initially approved by the 
Architectural Control Committee. 
The Respondents "spite" plantings, along with the arborvitae hedge height issue, 
has caused Appellant to suffer extreme property devaluation and diminution at the loss of 
her highly valued view of the River, a primary reason Greenfield purchased her property. 
In Sundowner, Inc. v. King, 509 P.2d 785 (Idaho 1973) "Under the modem 
American rule, however, one may not erect a structure for the sole purpose of annoying 
his neighbor. Many courts hold that a spite fence which serves no useful purpose may 
give rise to an action for both injunctive relief and damages." See 5 Powell, supra, ~ 
696, p. 277; IA Thompson on Real Property, § 239 (1964 ed.). "Many courts following 
the above rule further characterize a spite fence as a nuisance." See Hornsby v. Smith, 
191 Ga. 491, 13 S.E.2d 20 (1941); Barger v. Barringer, 151 N.C. 433, 66 S.E. 439 (1909); 
Annotation 133 A.L.R. 691; Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N.W. 838 (1888). 
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"Subsequently, many American jurisdictions have adopted and followed Burke so that it 
is clearly the prevailing modern view." See Powell, supra, il 696 at p. 279; Flaherty v. 
Moran, 81 Mich. 52, 45 N.W. 381 (1890); Barger v. Barringer, supra; Norton v. 
Randolph, 176 Ala. 381, 58 So. 283 (1912); Bush v. Mockett, 95 Neb. 552, 145 N.W. 
1001 (1914); Hibbard v. Hallidav, 58 Okla. 244, 158 P. 1158 (1916); Parker v. Harvey, 
164 So. 507 (La. App. 1935); Hornsby v. Smith, supra; Brittingham v. Robertson, 280 
A.2d 741 (Del. Ch. 1971). See the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Rideout v. Knox, 148 
Mass. 368, 19 N.E. 390 (1889). "In Burke a property owner built two 11 ft. fences 
blocking the light and air to his neighbors' windows. The fences served no useful purpose 
to their owner and were erected solely because of his malice toward his neighbor." 
See Austin v. BALD II, LLC, 658 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); "A spite fence 
is one which is of no beneficial use to the owner and which is erected and maintained 
solely for the purpose of annoying a neighbor." Welsh v. Todd, 260 N.C. 527, 528, 133 
S.E.2d 171, 173 ( 1963 ). "[A] fence erected maliciously and with no other purpose than 
to shut out the light and air from a neighbor's window is a nuisance." Barger v. 
Barringer, 151 N.C. 433,434, 66 S.E. 439,439 (1909) (citing 12 Arn. & Eng. Enc., 1058, 
and cases cited in note; 1 Cyc., 789). "It may be abated, subject to the same equitable 
principles which govern injunctive relief generally, and damages recovered if any have 
been sustained." Welsh, 260 N.C. at 528, 133 S.E.2d at 173 (citing Burris v. Creech, 220 
N.C. 302, 17 S.E.2d 123 (1941)). 
The record demonstrates that Respondents were on constructive notice to keep the 
arborvitae hedge 'fence' (See Idaho Code §35-102 (5) LAWFUL FENCES DESCRIBED) 
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trimmed to a maximum height of six (6) feet per the May 2006 written agreement 
between both parties'. 
Idaho State Code, City Ordinances, and CC&Rs mandate height restrictions on 
fences, which include hedges, due to the fact that the natural fences will continue to grow 
violating said codes, ordinances, and covenants if left unattended. Hedges have been 
considered natural fences for decades, wherein State Code and City Ordinances 
incorporate the word "Hedge" into the fence codes and / or ordinances to protect property 
owners from neighboring property owners who may be attempting to circumvent the law 
for their own self-interests. 
According to Appellants arborist Joe Zubaly, the "Emerald Green arborvitae 
shrub, a multi-stemmed plant, is a natural fence and this variety is used for privacy 
fences all the time" (See Testimony of Arborists Zubaly Pg. 431, Lines 16-25, Pg. 437, 
Lines 8-9, Pg. 451, Lines 20-25, Pg. 455, Lines 23-25, Pg. 456, Lines 5-8 and Appellants 
Attached Exhibit #8). 
Respondents deceitfully convinced the trial court that because the arborvitae 
shrubs may grow to a height exceeding fifteen (15) feet, they should be classified as 
trees. Yet by testimony, affidavits, and case documents, the Respondents and their expert 
witnesses referred to the arborvitae as shrubs, plants, and / or bushes, NOT trees, in 
multiple statements (See Pg. 457, Line 20-21, Pg. 458, Line 25, Pg. 459, Line 1, Lines 
23-25, Pg. 460, Lines 21-22). The Respondents Master Arborist, Tim Kastning, referred 
to the arborvitae as plants that are "generally referred to as shrubs" (See Pg. 44 line 7). 
On April 25, 2012, Tim Kastning refers to the arborvitae as shrubs ten (10) times in his 
written proposal (See Respondents Trial Exhibit #3). During his deposition, Mr. Kastning 
APPELLANT BRIEF 25 
referred to the arborvitae as "shrubs" approximately thirty (30) times (See Kastning 
Deposition pg. 25, lines 7, 12, pg. 28, lines 19, 24, 25, pg. 29, line 11, pg. 30, lines 10, 11, 
pg. 31, lines 3, 8, 13, pg. 32, line 25, pg. 33, lines 7, 9, 11, pg. 37, lines 10, 15, 25, pg. 38, 
lines 2, 14, 17, pg. 39, line 6, pg. 42, line 17, pg. 43, lines 4, 5, ~ line 7, pg. 46, line 
11, pg. 50, lines 6, 11, pg. 52, line 1) (See also Clerks Record Pg. 531-532). 
It is the belief of the Appellant that the only rational contemptible evaluation in 
deducing why the Respondents would insist that the arborvitae shrubs should be labeled 
as "trees", is to validate their derisive claim for "Timber Trespass." Even if this Court 
were to decide that the arborvitae are "trees", the argument is moot, as it would not deter 
from the fact that a line of shrubs, bushes, plants, and / or trees that form a "hedge" is 
considered to be a "fence", and may be abated as a nuisance (See Clerks Record Pgs. 
533-535 Definitions Fences I Hedges). 
Both Arborists testified that the ten (10) arborvitae shrubs were neither damaged 
nor destroyed, but are healthy and thriving, mostly due to pruning. The fact that the 
Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger cut the arborvitae hedge in 2006 claiming " .. .they were 7 
to 12 feet high before I pruned them ... " (See Trial Testimony of Eric Wurmlinger Pg. 302, 
Lines 10-20, Pg. 304, Lines 9-17) without damaging or destroying said hedge is evident 
by the numerous photos that were submitted during trial proceedings ((See Appellants 
Trial Exhibit #102 (A), Photo dated 2005 of hedge prior to Eric Wurmlinger cutting in 
2006 and Appellants Trial Exhibit #25 showing partial arborvitae hedge two (2) years 
after the 2006 cutting and Clerks Record Pg. 542). So is it logical to deduce that the 
identical ten (10) arborvitae shrubs, previously cut by the Respondent, would be neither 
damaged nor destroyed after the Appellants trimming, which was comparable in nature. 
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In the Alberino v. Balch, 969 A.2d 61, 65 (Vt. 2008) case, the fence was more 
visible from Balch's house than from Alberino who had erected the eight (8) foot tall 
"Spite" fence to obstruct Balch's view of the river. "There are, however, also cases 
holding that a fence with a primary purpose to annoy is also subject to abatement. The 
cases are uniform in their approval of reliance on the history of relations between 
neighbors as evidence of intent to annoy. See, e.g., Gertz v. Estes, 879 N.E.2d 617, 621 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008) ("The parties' conduct and the extraordinary nature of the fence were 
adequate to overcome [the] assertion that the eight-foot fence was intended to protect 
eighteen-inch tree seedlings."). We need not decide which standard is required generally; 
the factual backdrop here the photographs of the fence, the site visit, the contempt order 
concerning the other fence in virtually the same location, and over fifteen years of 
increasingly acrid disputes about dogs, brush piles, trespass, plowing, and noise-
supports a finding that the fence was intended solely to annoy Balch by obstructing his 
view and shading his property." "A Connecticut case cited by the trial court, DeCecco v. 
Beach, 381 A.2d 543 (Conn. 1977), is also instructive. In that case, the appellant-
landowner sought an injunction mandating that his neighbor remove four sections of a 
ten-foot-high wooden fence that blocked the appellant's view of a river. After concluding 
that there was support in the record for the trial court's conclusion that "malice was the 
primary motive in [the fence's] erection," the court noted that "the fact that it also served 
to protect the respondent's premises from observation must be regarded as only 
incidental, since to hold otherwise would be to nullify the [spite-fence] statutes." 
This is also true in this case where the arborvitae fence is more visible and 
invasive to the Appellant and has no useful purpose to the Respondents. Respondents 
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have minimal visibility on the Northwest side of their home facing Appellants property 
except for two small windows, one on the second story, which is located approximately 
twenty-five (25) feet from the ground, and the second smaller window located on the first 
floor, both of which look directly northwest to the city park and rear of Appellant's lot 
((See Appellants Trial Exhibit #102 (A) Window location). Evidence of this can be found 
in Respondent, Eric Wurmlingers, trial testimony about the location of his surveillance 
camera where he stated "That's a game camera and it's located on the west side of our 
home looking at the -- our side yard toward Black Bay Park and back toward Black Bay 
Park" (Trial Transcript Pg. 709, Lines 16-19). 
Further, Balch testified that "the fence has curled so much that it encroaches on 
his land, that it casts a shadow "halfway across [his] land," and that it "does not inhibit 
sound at all." Just as in this case the arborvitae fence encroaches onto Appellants 
property up to approximately three or more feet, the uncontrolled height blocks the 
coveted view of the river, and prevents sunlight onto Appellant's property. 
The Court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in Alberino v. Balch 
finding that the fence served "no objective purpose." See 24 V.S.A. § 3817 ("A person 
shall not erect or maintain an unnecessary fence or other structure for the purpose of 
annoying the owners of adjoining property by obstructing their view or depriving them of 
light or air."). 
In this case the Respondents have testified that they want privacy for their 
"Guests" (not family members) who purchase overnight accommodations. The 
arborvitae hedge fence has no useful purpose in providing "privacy" for the "guest" 
accommodations as said "guest" rooms are located on the bottom level of Respondents 
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home, on the opposite side (south) of the property. The mam floor "guest" 
accommodation faces the front yard of the Respondents property. The hot tub, which is 
located on the Respondents rear property line next to the park and is used by "guests", is 
enclosed in a darkened gazebo, surrounded by foliage, wherein the arborvitae hedge does 
not contribute any privacy for said hot tub. As for the "family" bedrooms, they too are 
located on the opposite side (south) of the Respondents home with one exception, the 
Respondents daughter currently utilizes the second floor bedroom that has a small 
window that peers out onto the northwest side of the property overlooking the park and 
rear boundary line of the Appellants property ((See Appellants Trial Exhibit #102 (A)). 
Generally, a movant qualifies for injunctive relief by showing: ( 1) a probable 
right ofrecovery; (2) imminent, irreparable harm will occur in the interim if the request is 
denied.; and (3) no adequate remedy at law exists. Despite this general rule, however, a 
movant seeking an injunction to enforce a restrictive covenant is not required to show 
proof of irreparable injury. See Guajardo v. Neece, 758 S.W.2d 696,698 (Tex. App. Fort 
Worth 1988, no writ). "Instead, the movant is only required to prove that the respondent 
intends to do an act that would breach the covenant. As previously noted, appellees were 
not required to show proof of irreparable injury because they were seeking an injunction 
to enforce a restrictive covenant. See Guajardo v. Neece, 758 S.W.2d at 698." 
C. Consolidating Issues (g)(h)(i)(n)(o)(p)(z) Survey, Nuisance, Abatement, Timber 
Trespass, Trespass 
When Appellant purchased her property in May 2005, Appellant hired Meckel 
Engineering to conduct a survey on her property (See Trial Testimony Christina 
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Greenfield, Pg. 538, Lines 17-19 and Clerks Record Pg. 516-524 o/717) to locate all of 
her property lines and comers. 
Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, also hired Inland Northwest Consultants to conduct 
a survey on his property in May 2005, as Respondents were planning on building a large 
addition to their home next to Appellant's property (See Appellants Trial Exhibit #109, 
2010 Tax "Detail Report" for 2005 survey costs of $5055 and Appellants Attached 
Exhibit #1). The Respondents surveyor located the northwest property comer and placed 
two wooden survey hubs in the center of the parties' property line at the base of two 
arborvitae shrubs, which were incorporated within the hedge row of ten (10) arborvitae 
shrubs that were trimmed by both parties' (See Trial Testimony Christina Greenfield, f.&.. 
539, Lines 13-19). 
By April 2006, Appellant had attempted to notify the Respondents that the top of 
the arborvitae hedge needed to be trimmed to the five ( 5) foot height to adhere to the 
PWP CC&Rs height restrictions for "Fences." The Respondents had not responded to 
Greenfield's request, so Appellant contacted the City of Post Falls Zoning Department 
seeking resolution. After contacting the Post Falls Code Enforcement Officer, Collin 
Coles; it was decided that the city would send a letter to the Respondents regarding the 
height restrictions in the city "fence" ordinance requiring that the arborvitae hedge must 
be maintained at the six (6) foot height (See Appellant Trial Exhibit #12). 
The Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, eventually trimmed all of the existing twenty 
four (24) arborvitae shrubs; the ten (10) west of the center Pine tree were trimmed to a 
height of approximately six (6) feet and the remaining fourteen (14) arborvitae shrubs 
east of the center pine tree were trimmed to a height of approximately nine (9) feet. 
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Appellant informed the Post Falls Code Enforcement Officer that the Respondents were 
not in full compliance. A second compliance letter was sent to the Respondents (See 
Appellant Trial Exhibit # 14). Respondents ignored the letter, so Appellant hired attorney 
Kacey Wall in May 2006, to draft a friendly "Cautionary" letter to the Respondents 
identifying PWP CC&R violations, including the arborvitae hedge height restriction. 
Respondent Eric Wurmlinger agreed that he would comply with the PWP CC&Rs 
and he would maintain the arborvitae hedge at its current height, which Greenfield agreed 
to, and no further action was taken (See Appellant Trial Exhibit #16, Pg. 2, Point #4). 
ln June 2006, following the above-mentioned agreement, Respondent Eric 
Wunnlinger planted two (2) large pine trees right next to the adjoining parties' property 
line near the Appellants northwest corner that partially blocked her view of the river (See 
Appellants Trial Exhibit # 102 (E) Photo of Pine Tree Next to Appellants Block Wall). 
The arborvitae hedge continued to grow and began to block Appellant's view of 
the river. It became apparent in Spring 2008 that the Respondents were disregarding their 
agreement with Appellant to maintain the arborvitae hedge at the agreed upon height of 
six ( 6) feet. The Respondent, Eric Wunnlinger planted an additional nine (9) arborvitae 
to existing arborvitae hedge on May 6, 2008, to further block Appellants view of the river 
(See Appellants Trial Exhibit #25). Appellant sent a note to the Respondent, Eric 
Wunnlinger, on May 26, 2008, (See Appellant Trial Exhibit #29) reminding him of their 
agreement or Appellant would " ... hire someone to trim them" (arborvitae) (See Idaho 
Code §35-111). Respondents ignored the Appellant's letter, so Appellant justly employed 
her brother-in-law on April 1, 2010, (23 months later) to trim the ten (10) arborvitae 
shrubs, previously cut by Respondent, Eric Wunnlinger, in April 2006 (See Trial 
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Testimony of Monroe Greenfield, Pg. 483, Lines 11-15, Lines 20-25, Pg. 484, Lines 1-21, 
Line 25, Pg. 485, Lines 1-4, Lines 8-25, Pg. 486, Lines 1-16, Lines 18-25, Pg. 478, Lines 
2-17). 
Greenfield had developed major health problems and was scheduled for major 
surgery on April 29, 2010, wherein she would be recuperating for up to ten (10) weeks. 
Greenfield specifically asked her brother-in-law, an experienced hedge trimmer, to trim 
the arborvitae hedge, simply so she could enjoy her coveted view of the river while 
recuperating from surgery. 
Because the arborvitae had also become an overgrown Nuisance (See Idaho Code 
§52-301) and was affecting Appellant in a damaging manner, Appellant is allowed by 
Idaho Law to abate the nuisance without harming the arborvitae. (See Idaho Codes §35-
105, §55-312, §52-302, §52-303). Both expert witnesses testified that the arborvitae 
shrubs were neither damaged nor destroyed by the Appellant's trimming. See Larsen v. 
Village of Lava Hot Springs, 88 Idaho 64,396 P 2d. 471 (1964); Vanderpol v. Starr, 194 
Cal. App. 4th 385 (2011). 
Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, upon viewing the trimmed arborvitae notified the 
Post Falls Police Department and alleged that Appellant, Greenfield had "Destroyed their 
arborvitae ... " (See Idaho Code §18-2601). This falsehood caused Greenfield to undergo 
weeks of interrogation from the Post Falls Police department, which led to a felony 
charge, causing Greenfield severe emotional stress at work and home while recuperating 
from surgery. 
The Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, had testified that the arborvitae shrubs he 
"planted approximately ten years earlier as a border planting between our properties" 
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(See Trial Testimony of Eric Wurmlinger, Pg. 294, Lines 16-20, Pg. 305, Lines 5-25, Pg. 
306, Lines 1-2). In Respondents Trial Brief (dated May 11, 2012, Pg.5, Paragraph 2(b), 
under ARGUMENT), it states: "the arborvitae hedge had been present on the parties' 
boundary line since 199 5 and were between ten (10) and twelve (12) feet tall." The 
Respondents Statement of Remaining Issues (dated November 8, 2012, ~, Paragraph 
2) states: "Do the arborvitae growing along the parties' property line constitute a 
nuisance?" (fg,_2, Paragraph 4) states: "Do the arborvitae planted on or near the 
property line between the arwellant :S and respondents' real property violate the Park 
Wood Place CC&Rs?" It appears by statements and/ or testimony that the Respondents 
believed that a mutual ownership of the arborvitae hedge also existed. See Holmberg v. 
Bergin 172 N.W.2d 739 (1969); Herrmann v. Larson, 214 Minn. 46, 7 N.W.2d 330; Jovce 
v. Village of Janesville, 132 Minn. 121, 155 N.W. 1067, L.R.A. 1916D, 426; Mead v. 
Vincent, 199 Okl. 508, 187 P.2d 994; Lemon v. Curington, 78 Idaho 522,306 P.2d 1091, 
64 A.L.R.2d 665; Shevlin v. Johnston, 56 Cal.App. 563, 205 P. 1087; Stevens v. Moon, 
54 Cal.App. 737, 202 P. 961; Gostina v. Ryland, 116 Wash. 228, 199 P. 298, 18 A.L.R. 
650; Buckingham v. Elliott, 62 Miss. 296, 52 Am.Rep. 188. 
Appellant may bring suit to abate the nuisance and to recover for damages done to 
her property. See Mead v. Vincent, supra; Shevlin v. Johnston, supra; Stevens v. Moon, 
supra; Gostina v. Ryland, supra. 
"In Nuisance cases (Abatement is a Nuisance Issue), as in other cases involving 
injunctive relief, the extent of the relief to be granted lies largely within the discretion of 
the trial court, and our function on appeal is to determine whether such discretion has 
been abused. See Robinson v. Westman, 224 Minn. 105, 29 N.W.2d 1, 174 A.L.R. 746. 
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This opinion cites: Cole v. Kunzler, 768 P.2d 815 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989), Ervin Const. 
Co. v. Van Orden, 874 P.2d 506 (Idaho 1993), Everhart v. COUNTY ROAD AND 
BRIDGE DEPT., 939 P.2d 849, Kawai Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 826 P.2d 1322 (Idaho 
1992), Kuglerv. Drown, 809 P.2d 1166 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991)." 
"The law is clear that one cannot exercise his right to plant a tree in such a 
manner as to invade the rights of adjoining landowners." See Vanderpol v. Starr, 194 Cal. 
App. 4th 385 (2011 ). The evidence in this case shows that Respondents, by planting and 
improperly maintaining the arborvitae hedge in question, are obstructing Appellant's free 
use and enjoyment of her property. "When one brings a foreign substance on his land, he 
must not permit it to injure his neighbor. Buckingham v. Elliott, supra; Mead v. Vincent, 
supra; Stevens v. Moon, supra; Parker v. Larsen, 86 Cal. 236, 24 P. 989." 
Respondents have cited no case holding that one adjoining landowner may plant a 
tree on his boundary line, or in such a manner that it will grow across the boundary line, 
thereby forcing an involuntary tenancy in common of the tree upon his neighbor under 
which neither can remove or damage the tree without the consent of the other, 
notwithstanding that such tree is damaging his neighbor's property. 
During the course of litigation both parties hired additional surveyor's to locate 
the exact location of the arborvitae shrubs in relationship to the parties' shared property 
line. The Appellant's Survey, which commenced on August 31, 2011, (See Appellant's 
Trial Exhibit #106) along with trial testimony by Licensed Surveyor, Dusty Obermayer, 
indicate that the ten (10) arborvitae shrubs, that were trimmed by both parties, are located 
on the shared property line (See Trial Testimony by Obermayer, Pg. 465, Lines 19-20, Pg. 
466, Line 20, Pg. 467, Lines 3-24, Pg. 468, Lines 5-12, Lines 17-25, Pg. 469, Lines 1-6). 
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The Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, testified that he only had one survey of his 
property completed (referring to the Monaco Survey) on October 14, 2011 (See Trial 
Testimony Pg. 304, Lines 19-25, Pg. 305, Line 1-2), but court records say otherwise, 
wherein Eric Wurmlinger hired Inland Northwest Consultants (INC) to perform a survey 
on June 30, 2005 and December 16, 2010 (See Clerks Record Pg. 566-568). 
The Post Falls Police Department Chief, Scot Haug and the Kootenai County 
Prosecutor, Barry McHugh along with the Respondents Eric and Rosalyn Wurmlinger, 
had all agreed (meeting at Kootenai County Prosecutors office on December 9, 2010, per 
Post Falls Police Report, Appellants Trial Exhibit #49, Pg. 9 and Appellants Attached 
Exhibit #6, Pg. 9) that a survey was mandatory to "verify the exact property line." 
The Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, initially paid the $450 fees to INC for said 
survey and was later reimbursed by the City of Post Falls and the Kootenai County 
Prosecutor (See Clerks Record Pgs. 566-568 and Trial Testimony of Detective Rodney 
Gunderson Pg. 634, Lines 1-25, Pg. 635, Lines 1-13). Appellant observed the INC 
survey crew mark several areas along the adjoining parties' property line with wooden 
stakes that were placed in the middle of the arborvitae hedge (See Aoude v. Mobil Oil 
Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir.1989). 
After said survey was performed, the Kootenai County Prosecutor amended the 
felony charge against Greenfield on June 10, 2011 and again on July 11, 2011, by adding 
the words "to wit: trees and I or shrubs, of a value in excess of One Thousand Dollars 
($1000), the property of Eric Wurmlinger, and I or property which was iointly owned by 
Eric Wurmlinger and the Respondent (Greenfield) ... "(See Appellant Trial Exhibit #82, 
Clerks Record Pg. 581, Appellants Attached Exhibit #5). The Respondents constantly 
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denied the existence of the December 16, 2010, survey and refused to turn over the 
findings of said survey to the Appellant through multiple discovery requests. 
Greenfield was acquitted of the bogus felony charge on October 4, 2011 (See 
Appellant Trial Exhibit #83), and on October 14, 2011 (See Respondents Trial Exhibit 
#B), ten (10) days later, the Respondents hired Jon Monaco to re-survey the previously 
surveyed adjoining property line. Since the Respondents had denied the existence of the 
December 16, 2010 survey during testimony, they could not utilize the findings of said 
nonexistent survey, as the Respondents would be guilty of perjury. 
Appellant believes that the reason behind Respondents decision to repudiate the 
survey, was because said survey showed that the location of the ten (10) arborvitae shrubs 
that Appellants agent had trimmed, were planted on the property line of both parties and 
mutual ownership existed (See Trial Testimony of Rodney Gunderson Pg. 649, Lines 20-
25) This information could have prevented Greenfield from suffering an additional nine 
(9) months awaiting trial for a spurious crime, of which she was eventually acquitted. 
It is disconcerting to the Appellant that the Respondents surveyor, Jon Monaco, 
testified that he DID NOT measure the base of the arborvitae shrubs as to their placement 
on the parties shared property line, yet the Respondents survey displayed tiny black dots 
that allegedly represented each of the arborvitae shrubs location along the parties' shared 
property line (See Deposition by Monaco Pg. 30, Lines 21-25, Pg. 31, Lines 5-12). 
Furthermore, Jon Monaco misstates the number of arborvitae shrubs, claiming 
there are thirty four (34), when in fact there are thirty three (33) arborvitae shrubs. 
Monaco also misrepresents the fact by stating that seventeen (17) arborvitae shrubs were 
trimmed when in fact only ten (10) arborvitae shrubs were trimmed by Appellant's agent. 
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Another puzzling element of Jon Monaco's survey, is that it specifies "Site Survey of lot 
7 and part of Lot 8." Respondents' own lot 7 and Appellant owns lot 6. Who owns lot 8? 
With so many discrepancies, one wonders if Jon Monaco actually performed a survey and 
on which lots? 
Clearly, the Respondents survey is irrelevant and non-conclusive as to the exact 
location of the ten (10) arborvitae shrubs. After Jon Monaco submits the unsupported 
survey, the Respondents Amend their Counter Claims by adding the 'Timber Trespass' 
Claim just ten (10) days after Greenfield was acquitted of the felony charge. The fact that 
Jon Monaco, a licensed surveyor with thirty (30) years' experience and owner of "Empire 
Surveying", testified that he knows the Idaho State Law in regard to licensed surveyors, 
but DID NOT validate his findings by signing said survey (See Idaho Code §54-1215) 
only makes the Appellant more suspicious of duplicitous behavior on behalf of both the 
Respondents and Jon Monaco. It is further noted that Appellant objected to the 
submission of the Monaco Survey during trial proceedings (See Appellants Attached 
Exhibit #3, Trial Minutes from 2:39:39 2:40:14 PM on November 29, 2012). 
""A "fraud on the court" occurs where it can be demonstrated, clearly and 
convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme 
calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter 
by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing 
party's claim or defense. See e.g., Alexander v. Robertson, 882 F.2d 421, 424 (9th 
Cir.1989); Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 538 F.2d 180, 195 (8th Cir.1976); 
England v. Doyle, 281 F.2d 304, 309 (9th Cir.1960); United Business Communications, 
Inc. v. Racal-Milgo, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1172, 1186-87 (D.Kan.1984); United States v. ITT 
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Corp., 349 F. Supp. 22, 29 (D.Conn.1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 919, 93 S. Ct. 1363, 35 
L.Ed.2d 582 (1973)."" "In our view, this gross misbehavior constituted fraud on the 
court. See Cleveland Demolition Co. v. Azcon Scrap Corp., 827 F.2d 984, 986 (4th 
Cir.1987) (fraud on court may exist where witness and attorney conspire to present 
periured testimony); Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1338 (5th Cir.1978) 
(same, where party. with counsel's collusion, fabricates evidence)." 
This Court must also consider the fact that both the Respondents and Appellants 
properties butt up against the City of Post Falls 'Black Bay' and public Park, which is 
open year round to the public. The PWP subdivision was developed along the river and 
park, wherein privacy is not an option when living in close proximity to said amenities. 
The Respondents have NOT enclosed any of their property by any other fences, 
hedges, screens, or structures of the like, other than the thirty three (3 3) arborvitae shrubs 
and spite trees on / or near the parties' adjoining property line (See Respondents Trial 
Exhibit #DD (1 ), Photos of spite trees and Exhibit #KK of Respondents Front yard). 
D. Respondents Dismissal of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim (k) 
The Respondents filed Counter Claims against Appellant for Intentional Infliction 
of Emotional Distress (I.I.E.D.) and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (N.I.E.D.) 
on October 21, 2010 ((See Clerks Record Pg. 47 (7)). Respondents then asked the Court 
to dismiss their N.I.E.D. claim and were granted said dismissal with prejudice on March 
22, 2011 (See Clerks Record Pg. 58). The Respondents then attempted to deceptively 
introduce the N.I.E.D. claim back into Trial proceedings on November 29, 2012, 
approximately twenty (20) months after said N.I.E.D. claim was dismissed with prejudice 
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by Judge Haynes. Respondents DID NOT utilize their claim for I.I.E.D. during trial 
proceedings, nor did they instruct the jury for said claim under 'Timber Trespass.' 
For Greenfield to be guilty of 'Timber Trespass' under Idaho Code §6-202, she 
must have acted willfully and intentionally. See Kenneth J. Good v. Larry W. Sichelstiel, 
(Idaho Ct. App. 2012). Greenfield had been acquitted of the felony charge for trimming 
the arborvitae shrubs due to the fact that the State did not have any evidence that 
Greenfield acted willfully and intentionally in trimming the arborvitaes shrubs (See 
Appellant Trial Exhibit #83, Acquittal). 
It is further noted that the Respondents 'Statement of Remaining Facts' dated 
November 8, 2012, submitted just twenty-one (21) days prior to Trial, DID NOT include 
the N.I.E.D. Claim in their statement of facts (See Clerks Record Pgs. 184-186 o/717). 
The Respondents are barred from bringing an action on the same claim. 
Dismissal with prejudice is a final judgment and the case becomes res judicata on the 
claims that were or could have been brought in it. 
E. Appellants Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim (I) 
The Appellant had attempted to resolve all of Respondents CC&R violations 
through legal representation in May 2006, and considered all matters moot at that time. 
However, the Respondents continued to aggressively harass the Appellant by 
engaging in combative maneuvers such as; 1.) trespassing on Appellants property (See 
Clerks Record Pgs. 133-135, Pg. 137-138. and Trial Testimony of Appellant Pg. 550. 
Lines 12-16); 2.) installing surveillance cameras aimed at Appellants property (See 
Appellants Trial Exhibit #102); 3.) moving Appellants personal property; 4.) making false 
allegations to law enforcement approximately twenty times, including having the 
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Appellant charged with a misdemeanor trespass in 2008 ( dismissed) (See Clerks Record, 
Pg. 135 (44)) and a felony in 2010 (acquittal); 5.) Appellants garbage was seized and 
searched; and 6.) endangering the Appellants life on one occasion when the Respondents 
called 911 and reported that a "prowler" was lurking in Appellants back yard, when in 
fact Appellant was watering her garden. The Appellant was surrounded by local law 
enforcement revealing weapons (See Clerks Record, Pg. 137 (51) and Trial Testimony of 
Appellant Christina Greenfield Pg. 553, Lines 12-24, Pg. 554, Lines 20-24). 
Due to the negative actions of the Respondents, Appellant was constantly under 
surveillance by local law enforcement and had the contents of her garbage seized 
purportedly to find evidence of alleged crimes (See Trial Testimony of Appellant 
Christina Greenfield) 
When Respondents noticed that the arborvitae shrubs had been trimmed in April 
2010, they contacted law enforcement and made false statements alleging that they had 
been the victims of a crime (See Appellants Trial Exhibit #49). The Respondents 
allegations were "FALSE" and were made intentionally and / or recklessly to harm 
Greenfield. 
On June 18, 2010, Greenfield, while at home on medical leave recuperating from 
major surgery, was served a summons (Dated June 3, 2010) by Kootenai County Sheriff 
Mike Douglas, who demanded that Greenfield go immediately to the Kootenai County 
Sheriff's building to get fingerprinted or a "Bench Warrant" for her arrest would be 
initiated, as she had been officially charged with "Felony Malicious Injury to Property" 
When Greenfield arrived at the Kootenai County Sherriff's building, Greenfield 
was informed that she needed to proceed directly to the "Jail." A female guard 
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approached Greenfield and handcuffed her hands behind her back. Greenfield began 
uncontrollably sobbing, petrified at what would transpire next. Appellant was in 
excruciating pain, as her hands were bound tightly behind her back in handcuffs, which 
were stretching her abdomen region where Greenfield had an eight (8) inch incision, 
extreme bruising, and multiple sutures from her recent surgery. Greenfield explained to 
the guard that she had surgery and was in a great deal of pain from standing and the 
position of the handcuffs. Greenfield asked the guard to lift her shirt and see where the 
incision was located so the guard would not cause Greenfield irreparable damage and 
additional trauma to the incision area during the search (See Trial Testimony of Appellant 
Christina Greenfield Pg. 542, Lines 10-25). 
Greenfield was forced to sit in a hard metal chair for hours while being processed 
for a felony, which included fingerprinting and "Mug Shots." Greenfield felt extremely 
violated, distraught, and nauseated at this point. Greenfield alerted the guard that she was 
not feeling well and in a great deal of pain. After approximately five (5) hours of 
excruciating pain and humiliation, Greenfield was finally released (See Trial Testimony of 
Appellant Christina Greenfield Pg. 543, Lines 9-17). 
The Appellant chooses to exercise her legal right to abatement pursuant to Idaho 
Code §52-302, wherein a "person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by removing, 
or, if necessary. destroying the thing which constitutes the nuisance ... " and is 
subsequently arrested and accused of committing a felony injury to property all at the 
request of the Respondents. The removal (trimming of arborvitae hedge) of the nuisance 
(hedge in excess of the height requirement that obstructed a premium "view" river front 
property) was not a breach of the peace or injury to Respondents. To make matters 
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worse, Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, contacted KXLY News and the local newspapers to 
persecute the Appellant as a "Hedge Hacker" defaming her good name and distorting the 
truth to the media (See Appellants Trial Exhibit #JOO). 
The Appellant was further victimized, wherein she was fired from her lucrative 
employment as a Senior Personal Banker with Bank of America ( a criminal background 
checked secured banking position) on September 2, 2010, due to the felony charge and 
the multiple mandatory court appearances. Greenfield was unable to find employment 
for the nineteen (19) months prior to her acquitted of the spurious charge, was unable to 
pay her bills, causing her credit score to plummet and was forced to file for bankruptcy. 
Greenfield also lost her "Bonding" ability, a crucial element in procuring employment in 
her field of expertise. See Davis v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735, 682 P.2d 1282 (1984); Spence 
v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 890 P.2d 714 (1995); Payne v. Wallace, 136 ldaho 303, 32 P.3d 
695 (2001); Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 118 ldaho 830, 801 P.2d 37 (1990). 
Greenfield suffers from severe emotional distress and health issues due to the 
constant intentional negligent actions and harassment from the Respondents over a span 
of eight years. 
In Appellants Amended Trial Brief, Appellant listed health issues due to the stress 
from Respondents constant harassment: On March 8, 2006, Greenfield was diagnosed 
with Erythema Nodosum ((See Clerks Record Pg.128(2O)); On June 26, 2007, Greenfield 
went to Kootenai Hospital for ultrasound testing for pain and swelling ((See Clerks 
Record Pg.I 33(35)); On February 12, 2009, Greenfield went to the Dime Clinic as she 
was experiencing severe chest-pain ((See Clerks Record Pg.141 (58)); On March 3, 2009, 
Greenfield saw Dr. Fritz for a heart stress test ((See Clerks Record Pg.141(59)); On 
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March 13,2009, Greenfield saw Dr. Ambrose as she was experiencing fatigue and female 
issues were elevated from stress. Greenfield was anemic and underwent an emergency 
medical procedure called a DNC ((See Clerks Record Pg.141(60)); On April 16, 2009, 
Greenfield saw Dr. Abate for heart related issues caused by stress and anxiety that she 
was experiencing ((See Clerks Record Pg.141(61)); On August 27, 2009, Greenfield went 
to Dime Clinic for fatigue, stress and anxiety related health issues. Blood test were done 
and Greenfield was diagnosed with anemia ((See Clerks Record Pg.142(66)); On October 
3, 2009, Greenfield went to Dime Clinic with heart related issues ((See Clerks Record 
Pg.142(67)); On February 11, 2010, Greenfield visited Dr. Ambrose to evaluate health 
concerns. Lab-tests were performed ((See Clerks Record Pg.143(68)); On February 20, 
2010, Greenfield visited Dr. Ambrose to evaluate health concerns with upcoming surgery 
((See Clerks Record Pg.143(69)); On February 22, 2010, Greenfield visited Dr. Ambrose 
to evaluate heart related issues with upcoming surgery ((See Clerks Record Pg.143(70)); 
On February 23, 2010, Greenfield was admitted to Kootenai Hospital for a medical 
procedure to be performed by Dr. Ambrose ((See Clerks Record Pg.143(71)); Due to 
heart related issues, surgery was not completed and rescheduled for a later date to be 
determined, which said medical procedure occurred on April 29, 2010 ((See Clerks 
Record Pg.144(78)); On September 8, 2011, Greenfield was rushed to the emergency 
room, while visiting her daughter in Colorado, with heart related issues ((See Clerks 
Record Pg.149 (95)). Appellant began weekly counseling sessions to cope with her 
debilitating emotional distress and depression in January 2011, and continuing through 
the present. Appellant continues to suffer from physical manifestations requiring medical 
attention. 
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Although Judge Haynes dismissed Appellants claim for Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress, Appellant suffers from the associated elements described herein of 
said intentional and negligent distress; "An action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress will lie only where there is extreme and outrageous conduct coupled with severe 
emotional distress. Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 100 Idaho 840, 606 P.2d 
944 ( 1980). The Arizona Court of Appeals put it this way: 
"There are four elements which must coincide to impose liability for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress: (1) conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) the 
conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) there must be a causal connection between 
the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress, and (4) the emotional distress must be 
severe. 
Emotional distress passes under various names, such as mental suffering, mental 
anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like. It includes all highly unpleasant mental 
reactions, such as fright horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin. 
disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is reasonable to believe that the Respondents had a 
motive to do harm to Appellant by deceptively submitting photographs to law 
enforcement (See Idaho Code § 18-2603) in April 2010, that indicated the arborvitae 
hedge height was approximately twelve (12) feet high, when in fact they ranged between 
six and one half (6 ½) to nine and one half (9 ½) feet tall when Appellants agent trimmed 
said arborvitae. Respondents did not inform law enforcement that the arborvitae shrubs 
were planted along the property line and a prior agreement to maintain the arborvitae 
hedge at a specified height had been conveyed by Respondents and Appellant in May 
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2006. The Respondents were hoping for a conviction to get rid of Greenfield through any 
devious method and / or propaganda they could cultivate. 
Greenfield suffered through nineteen (19) months of excruciating torture not 
knowing if she was going to be convicted of a felony for merely trimming ten (10) 
arborvitae shrubs. Greenfield, a fifty-six (56) year old grandmother, has never been 
arrested or convicted of any crimes prior to the fabricated felony charge. Greenfield had 
to refinance her home at a higher rate for a much longer term, sell a majority of her 
personal belongings, borrowed from relatives, file for bankruptcy and apply for food 
stamps to survive while waiting for trial and compensating her defense attorney. 
Greenfield developed life-threatening medical issues; including heart issues, and 
tumors, along with debilitating panic attacks, severe rashes, sleeplessness, excruciating 
headaches, nervousness, and fell into a deep depression, wherein she was isolated from 
family and friends. 
When considering the emotional distress caused to Greenfield, not only should the 
Appellant be awarded N.I.E.D. damages, but punitive damages as well, due to the 
Respondents disturbing behavior toward the Appellant. "An award of punitive damages 
is first within the province of the trier of fact, subject to review for abuse of discretion. 
Cheney v. Palos Verdes Investment Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 665 P.2d 661 (1983). That 
discretion is to be exercised within the "general advisory guidelines" laid down in the 
past, see id. at 905,665 P.2d at 669, but an award will be sustained only when it is shown 
that the act was "an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, and that the 
act was performed by the respondent with an understanding of or a disregard for its likely 
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consequences (in the words of prior cases. with fraud, malice or oppression)." Linscott v. 
Rainier National Life Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 854, 858, 606 P.2d 958, 962 (1980). 
The Respondents sedulous harassment was induced each and every time after 
Appellant utilized her legal right to bring the Respondents into compliance with the PWP 
CC&Rs and City Ordinances. 
F. Consolidating Issues (m)(y) Jury Instructions 
On October 29, 2012, Judge Haynes Pre-Trial Order stated that all parties' "shall 
submit their Jury Instructions no later than 5:00 PM on November 16, 2012" ((See 
Clerks Record Pg. 183(2)). The Appellant had timely submitted all of her jury 
instructions per Judge Haynes Order by said deadline. Judge Haynes DENIED all of the 
Appellants jury instructions and direct verdict form (See Appellants Attached Exhibit #7). 
Appellant did not receive the new jury instructions until 2:11 PM on November 30, 2012, 
the last day of trial (See Trial Transcript Pg.965, Lines 9-11, Lines 16-18). Appellant 
objected to the format of the new direct verdict form, stating that it may confuse the jury 
on the claims. 
A challenge to the adequacy of jury instructions presents a question of law over 
which this Court exercises free review. State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 647, 962 P.2d 
1026, 1031 (1998); State v. Harris, 136 Idaho 484,485, 36 P.3d 836, 837 (Ct.App.2001). 
This requires that we determine whether the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly and 
accurately state the applicable law. State v. Keaveny, 136 Idaho 31, 33, 28 P.3d 372, 374 
(2001); Harris, 136 Idaho at 485, 36 P.3d at 837. 
Judge Haynes had dismissed the Respondents Claim for Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress with Prejudice in March 2011 (See Hearing Transcript dated March 
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17, 2011, Pg. 61, Lines 7-9), yet Haynes allowed Jury Instruction #14 and #24 (See 
Clerks Record Pg. 238), which pertained to said dismissed N.I.E.D. Claim. 
Appellant requested that Jury Question # 18 should be separated into two parts as 
well: "Did appellant damage or destroy respondents' arborvitae and/or spruce tree?" 
Jury Instruction #21 is confusing and has no bearing in this case. 
There were NO Jury Instructions given on Appellants Claims m regard to: 
"Breach of Contract" and Idaho "Fence" Law. 
There were NO Jury Instructions given referencing the Respondents Claim for 
"Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress" and there is NO record of the Respondents 
requesting to omit said claim from their Defense. 
The Direct Verdict Form referred once more in #9 to Respondents dismissed 
N.I.E.D. Claim: "Did the appellant's general conduct negligently inflict emotional 
distress on the respondents?" 
Appellant contends that Judge Haynes did not sufficiently denote the meaning of 
the Idaho Code §6-202 regarding "Trespass" by omitting several key components of said 
statute in Jury Instructions #15, #16, #18, and #19 (See Clerks Record Pgs. 239, 242, 
243). For example; there is no mention of the term 'arborvitae', but instead the term 
'tree' is utilized in Idaho Code §6-202, yet instruction #18 references 'arborvitae' and 
instruction #19 'tree' is referenced and not 'arborvitae'. Why did Judge Haynes find it 
necessary to divide the meaning of the statute into three separate Jury Instructions and 
equate the word 'tree' and 'arborvitae' in one instruction and not the other, unless to 
confuse the jury. The Jury did question the 'Timber Trespass' verbiage and clarification 
was requested (See Appellant Attached Exhibit #4). 
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It is further noted that the Respondents stated a claim for "Timber Trespass", 
which pertains to a criminal action under Idaho Code §18-7008. Greenfield had been 
acquitted of Malicious Injury to Property, including trespass, which is encompassed in the 
Idaho Code §18-7008 for Trespass and Malicious Injuries to Property. 
See Austin; "When a party's requested jury instruction is correct and supported by 
the evidence, the trial court is required to give the instruction." Maglione v. Aegis Family 
Health Ctrs., 168 N.C.App. 49, 55, 607 S.E.2d 286, 291 (2005) (quoting Whiteside 
Estates, Inc. v. Highlands Cove, L.L.C., 146 N.C.App. 449, 464, 553 S.E.2d 431, 441 
(2001)). "In reviewing the trial court's decision to give or not give a jury instruction, the 
preliminary inquiry is whether, in the light most favorable to the proponent, the evidence 
presented is sufficient to support a reasonable inference of the elements of the claim 
asserted." Blum v. Worley, 121 N.C.App. 166, 168, 465 S.E.2d 16, 18 (1995) (citing 
Anderson v. Austin, 115 N.C.App. 134, 443 S.E.2d 737, 739 (1994)). "Once a party has 
aptly tendered a request for a specific instruction, correct in itself and supported by the 
evidence, failure of the trial court to render such instruction, in substance at least, is 
error." Worley, 121 N.C.App. at 168,465 S.E.2d at 18 (citing Faeber v. E.C.T. Corp., 16 
N.C.App. 429,430, 192 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1972)). "[I]t is the duty of the trial court to charge 
the law applicable to the substantive features of the case arising on the evidence and to 
apply the law to the various factual situations presented by the conflicting evidence." 
Faeber, 16 N.C.App. at 430, 192 S.E.2d at 2. 
"Whenever the latest edition of the Idaho Jury Instructions (IDJI) contains an 
instruction applicable to the case and the court determines that the jury should be 
instructed on the issue, it is recommended that the judge use the IDJI instruction unless 
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the judge finds that a different instruction would more adequately, accurately or clearly 
state the law I.R.C.P. 5l(a)(2). Use of the IDJI is not mandatory, only recommended. 
Needs v. Hebener, 118 Idaho 438, 442, 797 P.2d 146, 150 (Ct.App.1990). However, any 
court that chooses to vary from a jury instruction previously approved by the Idaho 
Supreme Court, does so with the risk that the verdict rendered may be overturned on 
appeal. See State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 64 7, 962 P.2d 1026, 1031 (1998). While it 
clearly is not error to modify an IDJI instruction, such modification will constitute error if 
the modified instruction does not conform to the state of the law or omits elements basic 
to the case. Ramco v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 118 Idaho 108, 111, 794 P.2d 1381, 1384 
(1990). Schaefer v. Ready, 3 P. 3d 56 - 2000." 
Appellate courts exercise free review over the question of whether a jury has been 
properly instructed. We must review the jury instructions given and ascertain whether, 
when considered as a whole, they fairly and adequately present the issues of the case and 
state the applicable law. DeGraff v. Wight, 130 Idaho 577, 579, 944 P.2d 712, 714 
(1997); Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 72, 76, 910 P.2d 744, 748 (1996). 
G. Consolidating Issues (q)(t) Constitutional Rights 
"In construing a restrictive covenant, a court's primary task is to determine the intent 
of the framers of the restrictive covenant. See Wilmoth v. Wilcox, 734 S.W.2d 656, 658 
(Tex.1987). In determining this intent, the court must liberally construe the covenant's 
language and must ensure that every provision is given effect. If there is ambiguity or 
doubt as to the intent, the covenant is to be strictly construed against the party seeking to 
enforce it in favor of the free and unrestricted use of the premises." 
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In this case there is NO AMBIGUITY (information, in words, pictures, or other 
media, is the ability to express more than one interpretation) as the PWP CC&Rs reads 
"NO BUSINESS IS ALLOWED." The River Cove Bed and Breakfast is a commercial, 
profitable business (See Appellants Trial Exhibit #109, Respondents Tax Records), open 
twelve (12) months of the year, which offers several suites, boat cruises, and a wedding 
facility to the public via internet and multiple advertising agents across the globe. 
Idaho recognizes the validity of covenants that restrict the use of private property. 
Nordstrom v. Guindon, 135 Idaho 343, 345, 17 P.3d 287, 290 (2000) (citing Brown v. 
Perkins. 129 Idaho 189, 192, 923 P.2d 434, 437 (1996)). "When interpreting such 
covenants, the Court generally applies the rules of contract construction. Id. However, 
because restrictive covenants are in derogation of the common law right to use land for 
all lawful purposes, the Court will not extend by implication any restriction not clearly 
expressed. Post v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 473, 475, 873 P.2d 118, 120 (citing Thomas v. 
Campbell, I 07 Idaho 398, 404, 690 P.2d 333, 339 (1984)). ""In applying the rules of 
contract construction, the court analyzes the document in two steps. Beginning with the 
plain language of the covenant, the first step is to determine whether or not there is an 
ambiguity. See Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho at 193, 923 P.2d at 438 (citing City of 
Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198,201,899 P.2d 411,414 (1995)). "Words 
or phrases that have established definitions in common use or settled legal are not 
rendered ambiguous merely because they are not defined in the document where they are 
used." City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho at 201, 899 P.2d at 414. Rather, 
a covenant is ambiguous when it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation on 
a given issue. Post v. Murphy, 125 Idaho at 475, 873 P.2d at 120 (citing Rutter v. 
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McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 612 P.2d 135 (1980)). Ambiguity is a question of law 
subject to plenary review. Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho at 192, 923 P.2d at 437. To 
determine whether or not a covenant is ambiguous, the court must view the agreement as 
a whole. Id. at 193, 923 P.2d at 437."" 
m'The second step in contract or covenant construction depends on whether or not 
an ambiguity has been found. If the covenants are unambiguous, then the court must 
apply them as a matter of law. See City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho at 
201, 899 P.2d at 414. "Where there is no ambiguity, there is no room for construction; 
the plain meaning governs." Post v. Murphy, 125 Idaho at 475, 873 P.2d at 120. 
Conversely, if there is an ambiguity in the covenants, then interpretation is a question of 
fact, and the Court must determine the intent of the parties at the time the instrument was 
drafted. Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho at 193, 923 P.2d at 438. To determine the drafters' 
intent, the Court looks to "the language of the covenants, the existing circumstances at 
the time of the formulation of the covenants, and the conduct of the parties."" 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has identified four types 
of unreasonable factual determinations in state court proceedings: (1) when state courts 
fail to make a finding of fact; (2) when state courts mistakenly make factual findings 
under the wrong legal standard; (3) when "the fact-finding process itself is defective"; or 
(4) when state courts "plainly misapprehend or misstate the record in making their 
findings, and the misapprehension goes to a material factual issue that is central to 
petitioner's claim." See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d. 992, 1000-01 (9th Cir. 2004). 
Appellant list the following due process issues: 1.) Judge Haynes allowed Appellants 
attorney to quit within eight (8) weeks prior to trial, leaving Appellant vulnerable for bias 
APPELLANT BRIEF 51 
and prejudice. Appellant informed the judge that trial deadlines had passed and that she 
could not afford another attorney; 2.) Judge Haynes should have insisted on a site 
evaluation so the jury could visually see the condition of the arborvitae, the property lay-
out of the homes and proximity of where the river, park, and homes were located in 
relationship to one another; 3.) Judge Haynes did not allow Appellants timely disclosed 
witness Leonard Benes to testify on behalf of Appellant, a crucial factor to the Appellants 
defense (See Trial Transcript Pg.963, Lines 12-13); 4.) Judge Haynes allowed the 
Respondents to submit evidence at trial that was never disclosed to Appellant and was in 
violation of the November 8, 2012, deadline per Court Order (See Clerks Record Pg. 201, 
Paragraph #2, and Pg. 202); 5.) Judge Haynes allowed the Jury Instructions to be altered 
from their original state as quoted within the Idaho Codes; 6.) Judge Haynes did not grant 
Injunctions to Appellant for Abatement and PWP CC&R violations as requested. 
""The Court as the finder of fact may conduct a site visit or other analogous 
inspection, and may "base its findings upon such examination together with all the 
evidence in the case." See Daigle v. Conley, 121 Vt. 305, 309, 155 A.2d 744, 748 (1959) 
(emphasis added); see also In re Quechee Lakes Corp., 154 Vt. 543, 551-52, 580 A.2d 
957, 962 (1990) (administrative fact-finder may rely to same extent as trial judge on 
knowledge gained from a site visit); Cass-Warner Corp. v. Brickman, 126 Vt. 329, 336, 
229 A.2d 309, 314 (1967) (affirming verdict based in part on court's view of allegedly 
defective bulkhead); McAndrews v. Leonard, 99 Vt. 512, 521, 134 A. 710, 714 (1926) 
(upholding jury verdict based in part on jury's inspection of tort appellant's allegedly 
injured skull, holding that "the jury had a right to base their verdict upon such 
examination together with all the evidence in the case")."" The Court cannot visually 
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comprehend a distorted image on paper (Respondents Trial Exhibit #CC), which is used 
to illustrate where the river, park, hedge, and homes are located in relationship to each 
other in the PWP subdivision, when deciding this case (See Trial Testimony of Appellant 
Christina Greenfield Pg. 586, Lines 15-25, Pg. 587, Lines 1-7). 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it determined a row of thirty 
three (3 3) trees ( arborvitae shrubs) in their natural state that formed a hedge, was not a 
fence or other structure in the nature of a fence, as so intended within the meaning of the 
unambiguous PWP CC&Rs. 
It is for the trial court in the first instance to make the necessary factual findings, 
based on the evidence received at trial, to determine whether the row of trees (arborvitae) 
in this case satisfies all of the elements of a spite fence. See Wilson v. Handley, 119 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 263,267 (Ct. App. 2002) 
The facts are clear that States and Cities alike purposely control the height of 
fences and like structures to a six ( 6) foot height and regulate zoning laws for purposes of 
protecting land owners from abusive contemptuous property owners who do not want to 
adhere to regulatory law. 
The Respondents admitted to having knowledge of the PWP CC&Rs and they 
chose to violate said CC&Rs. 
H. Consolidating Issues (r)(s) Respondents Award of Attorney Fees 
The Appellant has reasonable cause to believe that Respondents have violated the 
law under the "un-clean hands" doctrine, wherein they deceptively corrupted the Court 
by submitting falsified testimony and evidence into trial. See Campbell v. Kildew, 141 
Idaho 640, 648, 115 P.3d 731 (2005). This contaminated so-called evidence (Survey, 
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N.I.E.D. Claim) cannot sustain the verdict that was rendered and should not entitle 
Respondents to recover any damages and / or sums in this cause. See Russell v. 
Chamberlain, 12 Ida. 299, 303, 9 Ann. Cas. 1173, 85 Pac. 926; Potter v. Seattle, 8 Cal. 
217,221; Grant v. Moore, 29 Cal. 644, 656; Anderson v. Coleman, 53 Cal. 188; Vesper 
v. Crane Co., 165 Cal. 36, 130 Pac. 876, L. R. A. 1915A, 541. 
The district court awarded damages in the amount of $168,000 (See Clerks 
Record Pgs. 675-67Q] to Respondents pursuant to erroneous interpretations of the law 
regarding Idaho Code §6-202. Appellant should not be expected to pay for damages that 
never occurred on property that she jointly owns. For argument purposes, even if the 
arborvitae shrubs were all located on the Respondents property, said property was never 
defined with "No Trespass" signs, and there was no intent by the Appellant to destroy or 
damage said arborvitae, both contributing factors in finding guilt, per Idaho Code. If this 
were the case, the Appellant would have been found guilty under the alleged felony 
charge for essentially the same offense, of which she was acquitted. 
The Respondents interpretation of the word "Tree" was so absurd that any scholar 
would wince at the epilogue used to persuade the jury that a shrub can become a tree 
simply because it may grow to a height of fifteen (15) feet. Ridiculous! 
For example purposes, the following shrubs, plants, and / or bushes; Lilac bush, 
Perfume Bush, Giant Milkweed Bush, Golden Dewdrop, Cherry Laurel, Gibb's Firethorn, 
Japanese Holly Sky Pencil, and the Emerald Green arborvitae, just to name a few, have 
the ability to grow to a height of fifteen ( 15) feet, have multiple stems, yet they remain 
labeled as a bush, plant or shrub. Appellant does not have personal knowledge or any 
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expert opinions on the matter regarding the harvesting of these varieties for their 
"Timber" value. 
The trial court based its judgment award upon the market value of the alleged 
damaged and / or destroyed trees ( arborvitae shrubs) as merchantable timber under Idaho 
Code §6-202 for Timber Trespass, and evidence demonstrated that the trees (arborvitae 
shrubs) were not cultivated for such use, but instead utilized as a screen (fence), which 
violated the PWP CC&Rs and they were neither damaged nor destroyed as testified by 
both arborists. There was NO aesthetic value, as the arborvitae shrubs were NOT 
damaged or destroyed, and there was no devaluation of property value due to the natural 
trimming. 
The Respondents convoluted the action brought by the Appellant after submitting 
claims that they later dismissed (Tortious Interference with Economic Advantage and 
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress), then resubmitting a new claim thirteen 
months later for Timber Trespass, just fourteen (14) days after the Appellant was 
acquitted of a bogus crime for Malicious Injury to Property. 
Much of the Respondents trial evidence was offered just prior to / or at trial (late 
disclosure) and has absolutely nothing to do with their claims, but rather irrational 
assumptions after the fact (Pictures of alleged vandalism after the fact, pictures of 
neighboring arborvitae shrubs, a distorted aerial view, a hand drawn alleged site plan 
with no dimensions, and various unsubstantiated hearsay testimony). 
The Respondents repeatedly ignored Court Orders by not responding to discovery 
requests, which Appellant was eventually awarded Sanctions and attorney fees (See 
Transcript Pg. 76, Lines I 7-25). Constant delays due to countless rotation of 
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Respondents attorneys of record caused further frustration and monetary damage to 
Appellant, wherein Appellants attorney fees quadrupled. Appellant believes that the 
blatant disregard for court proceedings was due to the fact that the Respondents court 
costs were covered by their Commercial Business Insurance Binder Policy (Per 
Testimony of Eric Wurmlinger), which covered the Respondents attorney fees and related 
costs on counterclaims and defense. 
There is no evidence to prove that the Wurmlingers suffered any mental or 
physical manifestations for emotional distress as to the Appellants alleged conduct. See 
Davis v. Gage, 682 P.2d 1282 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984); Venerias v. Johnson, 622 P.2d 55 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1980). The Respondents could not verify that they suffered any 
emotional distress by offering such evidence, as medical evaluations or the contrary. 
Respondent Eric Wurmlinger testified that he did not have any physical, mental, or 
medical conditions from emotional distress stating " .. . I have not gone to the doctor" (See 
Trial Testimony of Eric Wurmlinger Pg. 837, Lines 8-17) Rosalyn Wurmlinger testified 
that she had flu like symptoms, but never saw a doctor. If Respondents symptoms were 
that serious, they would have sought medical treatment and / or counseling (See Trial 
Testimony of Rosalyn Wurmlinger Pg. 939, Lines 8-19, Pg. 954, Lines 2-7, Lines 11-14). 
As mentioned above in testimony, it was the Respondents who repeatedly reported to law 
enforcement that the Appellant was guilty of alleged crimes, therefore causing extreme 
emotional distress to the Appellant, unless the Respondents are claiming that their bad 
behavior was causing their own stress? 
"In the case of Board of County Commissioners of Weld County v. Slovek, 723 
P.2d 1309, 1315 (Colo. 1986), the Colorado Supreme Court warned that the trial court 
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must undertake careful evaluation when allowing an injured party to recover costs of 
restoration that are greater than the diminution in market value because of the possibility 
that the injured party will receive a monetary windfall. See Weitz, 148 Idaho at 866, 230 
P.3d at 758." 
Individuals may value land for specific and personal reasons, and in such 
instances, justice requires that an award of damages restore such property owners to the 
position they enjoyed prior to the damage. The Respondents suffered no damage as the 
ten (10) arborvitae shrubs were previously cut by the Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, in 
May 2006, then trimmed to the same height a second time in April 2010 by the 
Appellant's agent. Appellant, however, lost her coveted view of the river due to malice 
by the Respondents, who should not be rewarded for their fraudulent behavior in offering 
tainted evidence, duplicitous documents, lately disclosed evidence, and false testimony. 
See Aoude. ""We find the caselaw fully consonant with the view that a federal 
district judge can order dismissal or default where a litigant has stooped to the level of 
fraud on the court. The Supreme Court said so in Hazel-Atlas, albeit in dicta. Id. at 250, 
64 S. Ct. at 1003. The most closely analogous cases we can find, in our own circuit and in 
a variety of other courts, stand for much the same proposition. See, e.g., Brockton 
Savings Bank, 771 F.2d at 11-12 ( affirming district court's entry of default judgment 
under court's inherent powers in response to defendant's abusive litigation practices); 
Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 589 (9th Cir.1983) ("courts have 
inherent power to dismiss an action when a party has willfully deceived the court and 
engaged in conduct utterly inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice"); Eppes 
v. Snowden, 656 F.Supp. 1267, 1279 (E.D.Ky.1986) (where fraud committed, court has 
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"inherent power [to dismiss] ... to protect the integrity of its proceedings"); United States 
v. Moss-American, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 214,216 (E.D.Wis.1978) (similar); C.B.H. Resources, 
Inc. v. Mars Forging Co., 98 F.R.D. 564, 569 (W.D.Pa.1983) (dismissing under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 41 (b) where party's fraudulent scheme, including use of a bogus subpoena, was 
"totally at odds with ... the notions of fairness central to our system of litigation"). In 
most of these cases, we hasten to add, the challenged conduct seems, arguably, less 
reprehensible than in the case at bar. The bogus agreement clearly had the capacity to 
influence the adjudication and to hinder Mobil's presentation of its case."" As in this case 
the Respondent's bogus survey and other documents clearly influenced the jury's 
decision. ""The failure of a party's corrupt plan does not immunize the defrauder from 
the consequences of his misconduct. When Aoude concocted the agreement, and 
thereafter when he and his counsel annexed it to the complaint, they plainly thought it 
material. That being so, "[t]hey are in no position now to dispute its effectiveness." 
Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 247, 64 S.Ct. at 1002. See also Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault 
Ste. Marie Rv. Co. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520, 521-22, 51 S.Ct. 501, 502, 75 L.Ed. 1243 
(1931) (litigant who engages in misconduct "will not be permitted the benefit of 
calculation, which can be little better than speculation, as to the extent of the wrong 
inflicted upon his opponent")."" 
I. Consolidating Issues (u)(v)(w)(x)(bb) Judge Haynes Controversy and Bias 
The Respondents officially amended their counter claims by adding trespass and 
timber trespass on October 17, 2011 (See Clerks Record Pg. 71), thirteen (13) days after 
Appellant was acquitted of the Felony Malicious Injury to Property charge. Judge 
Haynes did not respond to the Respondents Amendment until December 15, 2011 (See 
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Clerks Record Pg. 76-77), almost two (2) months later. The Certificate of Mailing 
attached to said Order is dated September 19, 2011. There are discrepancies on both 
documents and time lines exceed Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
On May 21, 2012, Appellant requested a hearing for Motion to Amend Pre-trial 
Order, wherein Appellant requested under rules of discovery that the Respondent 
surrender key pieces of information that were demanded on several prior discovery 
requests (See Clerks Record Pgs. 113-121, Trial Transcript Pg. 76, Lines 17-25, Pg.81, 
Lines 14-25 ). The Respondents did not comply. The Appellant objected to the 
Respondents late disclosure of said additional evidence presented during trial 
proceedings, approximately six (6) months after the Court Order. Judge Haynes 
overruled Appellants objections. 
The Respondents ignored Judge Haynes Pre-Trial Conference Order, wherein all 
Exhibit and Witness Lists were due no later than 5:00 P.M. on November 9, 2012 (See 
Clerks Record Pg. 182-183). Respondents amended their lists five times by adding 
additional exhibits and witnesses that were never disclosed in prior discovery: Original 
list submitted 5/4/2012, Received by Appellant 5/4/2012 (Exhibits a-bb); Amended list 
submitted 11/8/2012, Received by Appellant 11/9/2012 (Exhibits a-ll); 2nd Amended list 
submitted 11/15/2012, Received by Appellant 11/16/2012 (Exhibits a-oo); 3rd Amended 
list submitted 11/15/2012, Received by Appellant 11/19/2012 (Exhibits a-pp); 4th 
Amended list submitted 11/26/2012, Received by Appellant 11/26/2012 (Exhibits a-rr -
ss, written in at trial). Appellant objected to the Respondents untimely submitted 
exhibits, yet Judge Haynes "overruled" said objections, which contributed to the collapse 
of Appellants defense to said alleged evidence. 
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Appellant requested waivers on court fees with her Notice of Appeal, as she is an 
Indigent person. The presiding Judge Penny Friedlander granted Appellant said fee 
waivers. Judge Haynes then interfered with the Court Order and rescinded Appellants 
said fee waivers for no justifiable reason on July 18, 2013. 
The judge must consider the proper mix of factors and juxtapose them reasonably. 
Abuse occurs when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored, when an 
improper factor is relied upon (Monaco Survey, NJE.D. Claim, Late Disclosure of 
Evidence and Exhibits), or when all proper and no improper factors are assessed, but the 
court makes a serious mistake in weighing them (Appellants Objection to Monaco 
Unsigned Survey). See "Independent Oil and Chemical Workers of Quincy, Inc. v. 
Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir.1988); See also Anderson v. 
Crvovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 923 (1st Cir.1988) (to warrant reversal for abuse of 
discretion, it must "plainly appear that the court below committed a meaningful error in 
judgment"). 
Appellant believes that District Court Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes 
committed 'Fraud Upon the Court' as witnessed and verified by the Appellant on 
December 30, 2013. Appellant was viewing her case file, wherein she observed the 
Honorable Judge Lansing Haynes case file notes, in which Haynes stated "The only issue 
that concerns me is the N.I.E.D. (Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress) claim being 
dismissed ... We can play up the former counsel's decision and the no objection to putting 
it to the jury later on." Judge Haynes had dismissed the Respondents N.I.E.D. claim with 
prejudice a year and a half prior to trial. Judge Haynes exhibited blatant prejudice toward 
the Appellant by negating his judicial duty to uphold his ruling by allowing the 
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Respondents to resubmit their N .LE.D. claim, during trial proceedings, after he had 
previously dismissed said claim (See Appellants Attached Exhibit #9). 
Appellant believes that Judge Haynes should have disqualified himself as the 
presiding judge in the civil action against the Respondents, wherein Appellant uncovered 
evidence during and after the civil proceedings, which has undermined said proceedings. 
Appellant discovered in March 2013 that Judge Lansing Haynes, his law clerk, 
"Buck" Pennington, and Respondent, Eric Wurmlinger, all belong to the local Catholic 
association of the "Knights of Columbus", a fraternal Catholic order of men who call 
themselves the "Brotherhood" " ... primarily to serve the Catholic Church, and 
secondarily the men who are members, by providing a means and conduit through which 
they may help each other ... " (See Transcript on Appeal Pg. 1038, Lines 7-25). 
On the May 1, 2013, Hearing, Greenfield was shocked when Judge Haynes stated 
"as such, theres no prejudice other than self-inflicted prejudice, 1 might characterize it, 
not that a person doesn't have the right to represent themselves, but its just never a good 
idea if theres any other way around it" (See Transcript on Appeal Pg. I 089, Lines 20-24, 
Motion for Reconsideration). Appellant NEVER planned on representing herself. Judge 
Haynes allowed Appellants attorney, Ian D. Smith, to walk away with ALL of 
Greenfield's money just prior to the scheduled court trial (See Trial Transcript for 
February 27, 2012, Pg.JO, Lines 18-25, Pg.11, Lines 1-9) 
In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if an 
objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If 
a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and 
impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified." See Liteky v. U.S., 114 S. 
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Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994). Courts have stated that a trial judge must always remain fair and 
impartial. See Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 702, 709 (9th Cir. 1989). 
"He must be ever mindful of the sensitive role [the court] plays in a jury trial and avoid 
even the appearance of advocacy or partiality." Id. quoting United States v. Harris, 501 
F.2d 1, 10 (9th Cir. 1974). 
The Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is 
not a requirement, only the appearance of partiality. See Liljeberg v. Health Services 
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S. Ct. 2194 (1988) "what matters is not the reality 
of bias or prejudice but its appearance"; See United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 
(7th Cir. 1985). 
Two principal Federal statutes dealing with judicial recusal are 28 U.S.C. §144, 
"Bias or prejudice of judge" and 28 U.S.C. §455, "Disqualification of justice, judge, or 
magistrate." Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §455(a), is intended to 
protect litigants from actual bias and promote public confidence in the judicial process. 
The Court also stated that Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recuse himself in any 
proceeding in which impartiality might reasonably be questioned." See Taylor v. O'Grady, 
888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the 
Court stated that "It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that 
he believes that he has received justice." 
The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must 
satisfy the appearance of justice", See Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S. Ct. 
1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S. Ct. 11, 13 (1954). 
Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion asking 
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for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further stated that "We 
think that this language [455(a)] imposes a duty on the judge to act sua sponte, even if no 
motion or affidavit is filed." Balistrieri, at 1202. 
If a judge does not disqualify himself, then the judge is in violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 
(7th Cir. 1996) "The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on 
section 144, but on the Due Process Clause." "The Supreme Court has also held that if a 
judge wars against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in 
treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after he has been automatically disqualified by 
law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and that suggest that he is then engaging in 
criminal acts of treason, and may be engaged in extortion and the interference with 
interstate commerce." 
See Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir.1989) ""The district 
courts retain the inherent power to do what is necessary and proper to conduct judicial 
business in a satisfactory manner. As we have said, that inherent power is "rooted in the 
chancellor's equity powers, 'to process litigation to a just and equitable conclusion.' " 
HMG Property, 847 F.2d at 915 (quoting ITT Community Development Corp. v. Barton, 
569 F.2d 1351, 1359 (5th Cir.1978)). The courts' inherent power includes "the ability to 
do whatever is reasonably necessary to deter abuse of the judicial process." Eash v. 
Riggins Trucking Inc., 7 57 F.2d 5 57, 567 (3d Cir.1985) ( en bane). 
IV.REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Finally, as a pro se litigant, inexperienced in the art of drafting pleadings, I would appreciate 
the opportunity to offer oral argument in support of this brief. 
APPELLANT BRIEF 63 
V. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the rulings of the District Court and 
remand this case for further proceedings, including the right to perform additional reasonable 
discovery and / or; 
1. Reverse the District Court ruling that the River Cove Bed and Breakfast is not prohibited 
by the Park Wood Place Subdivision CC&Rs; 
2. Reverse the District Court ruling that the Arborvitae hedge does not constitute a Fence; 
3. Reverse the District Court ruling that the Arborvitae shrubs are not exceeding the height 
restrictions for fences as set forth in the Park Wood Place CC&Rs; 
4. Reverse the District Court ruling that the Appellant did not suffer from the Respondents 
negligent actions and Appellant should be awarded damages for Nuisances; 
5. Reverse the District Court ruling that the Arborvitae Hedge is not a nuisance and 
therefore should be Abated; 
6. Reverse the District Court ruling that the Respondents should not be required to remove 
all spite shrubs and trees that are impeding Appellants river view and the free use of 
property, and interferes with the Appellant's comfortable enjoyment oflife and property; 
7. Reverse the District Court ruling that the Appellant did not suffer from the Respondents 
actions and award damages to Appellant for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; 
8. Reverse the District Court ruling that the Appellant did not suffer from the Respondents 
actions and award damages to Appellant for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; 
9. Should this Court decide that Judge Lansing Haynes should have disqualified himself 
from said proceedings, therefore nullifying all Court Orders, then Order a New Trial with 
all Statute of Limitations kept intact and void all Final Judgments and awards. 
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DATED this 25th day of June, 2014. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of June, 2014, I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
John C. Riseborough 
Paine Hamblen, LLP 
717 W. Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200 
Spokane, WA 99201 
The Supreme Court of Idaho 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101 
APPELLANT BRIEF 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[X] HAND DELIVERED 
[X] U.S. Mail 
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Detail Reeort 12/31/2.010 Eric J and Rosa~11d D Wunnllnser 
Soh C: BED ANO 288140 0 0 2356 0 241 482 147 139 
Item Description of Date Asset Bus. Cost or Sec. 179 Credit Special Salvage Recovery Recovery Prior Accum. 
No. Property Placed In Code Use other Deduction Allowance Value Basis Depree., 
"*"' indicates DISPOSED Service % Basis 179 Bonus 
1 Stereo System 5/611994 1,075 0 0 1,055 
2 TV 2122/1997 578 0 0 578 
2 Bed 5/28/1994 252 0 0 252 
3 Entertainment Center 1/5/1997 925 0 0 925 
3 SPA 6/4/1995 6,391 0 0 6,391 
4 Bed 211/1999 66!;1 0 0 HY 668 
4 Grandfather Clock 12/23/1995 1,364 0 0 HY 1,364 
5 Bed 1/1/1999 785 0 0 • HY 784 
5 Sofa 10/a,'1995 653 0 0 . 7 HY 653 
6 OIi Painting 3/1/1999 750 0 7 HY ·· 750 
6 Blinds 411 4/1995 582 0 2 7 HY 582 
7 Paddle Boat 5/14/1998 380 0 380 5 MQ3 380 .. . 
8 •• Washer/Dryer 5/19/1998 608 0 608 5 MQ3 600 
9 Printer o/21/1998 560 0 0 560 5 MQ3 560 
9 Computer 6/211997 3'A 0 0 3,224 5 HY 3,224 
10 Gas Fireplace 12/15/1998 0 0 2,283 5 MQ4 2,283 
11 Mower 7/1/1998 0 0 330 5 MQ3 329 
~12 Bed and Breakfast 5/8/1994 0 0 118,488 31 .5 MM 64,531 
19 2000 Chapponal Guest Boat 5/1412001 0 0 60,538 5 HY 46,426 
20 Flooring for B&B rooms 8/15/2004 0 0 3,790 39 MM 538 
24 Outdoor Music System 8 0 0 3,340 7 HY 2,296 
25 Outdoor Patio Water Feature 0 0 24,725 15 HY 9,316 
25 Garden Arbor 0 0 673 7 HY 463 
26 2005 Planning Surveying 0 0 5,055 27.5 MM 836 
26 Laptop Computer 599 0 599 6 HY 911 
26 Entry Doors 0 0 1,110 27.5 MM 123 
27 Dlrrlng Furniture 274 0 273 7 HY 313 
28 W8$her/Dryer 1,483 0 1,483 5 HY . o. 
Sub Totals 288,140 0 0 2,356 0 241 ,482 147,1:39 
Le$$: Disposed Assets 608) O} .0) 0) O} 608) roai 
Ending Totals ;m.~ Q 0 H56 Q 2~,8~ l~,lr3l 









buddy buddy with def, put been in his home twice. Don't hang 
out, never been in his boat. He turns on my water and blows it 
out, we split rental of the equipment. 8-6 roughly. Saw Dwight 
and you load truck. Only time I've seen several truck loads with 
tarp over a couple of days. Easter weekend. Detective 
Gunderson called me. Comments by def about you and likewise 
with you about him. We haven't spoken recently, about a dozen 
in the past. Wasn't aware Dwight had a brother until about a 
year ago. Def said it was a twin brother. 
Redirect. 
He didn't have a full white beard. I was asked to sign resolution 
that def were good neighbors. It was all true. I went to pit's 
house to tell her that I had done that. She wanted to know if 
anything said in it about her. I said if names were switched I'd 
sign it. She said def would learn if you mess with the bull you 




Have video depo to play, marks as exhibit TT. DVD deposition 
of John Monaco. 
ohn Monaco is played. 
fternoon recess, 10 mins. Admonishes jurors. 
ack on the record. 
Moves to admit exhibt B from the video. 
Plays deposition video of Tim astning. 
I Moves to admit C and Page 2 of 0. 
Admits 0-2 
Admits exhibit C. 
Recess for the day. Reconvene at 9 am tomorrow. Admonishes 
£.el.~'£; /d!-.3 
file://R:\LogNotes - HTML\District\Civil\Haynes\CV 2010-8209 Greenfield vs Wurmlinge... 1/22/2013 








07:59:50 PM J 
08:03:10 PM J 
08:05:08 PM 
J 
Back on the record. Mr. Riseborough is not present. Pit is 
present. DA was called and not answered. 
Question by jury, asking to define timber trespass. I intend to 
answer #16 defines trespass and #19 defines trepass. 
No objection. 
Jury is seated. I instructed parties to be within 10 mins. We have 
called DA a few times. I instruct the jury that instruction 16 
defines trespass and 19 defines timber trespass. 
's verdict. 
hanks jurors. Excuses jurors. 
DA to produce order that reflects verdict. Now still some court 
trial issues to be addressed. Will schedule a status conference 
in the future regarding equity matter. 
Produced by FTR Gold™ 
www.fortherecord.com 
f ;· '; ti:.L t)<_ U/4 1 I I 
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2011/JUL/11/MOM 11:15 KO CO PROSECUTER 
BARRY McHUOH 
Prosecuting Attorney 
50'1 ·Govt. Way/Box 9000 
Coeurd'Alene,ID 83814 
'felepbone: (208) 446-1800 
Fax: (208}446-1833 
FAX No. 208-446-1841 
IN THE DISTR1CT COURT OF THE IR.ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
I 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FO. THE COUNTY·OFK.OOTENAI 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plwntiff, 
vs. 









COMES NOW, AMY BORGMAN, Dep ty Prosecutor for Kootenai County, State ofldaho, 
and hereby amends the infonnation in this action: . d complains that1he above:named defendant did 
commit the crime ~f MALICIOUS JNJURJT .• PROPERTY, aFeloqy .• Idaho Code Section"l8-
. 7001, 18-204, committed as follows: · 
· ~attheDefendant,CHIUSTINA . GREENFIELD, onorabontthe 10111-.24111 d4yof 
March, 201 0,"in the' County of Kooteruu, State o , dabo, did.aid and.abet anothor.in the commission . 
.. of and/or did herself maliciousty"irijure and/or de· trQy certain Teal or:persomilpropet'\y., io-wit:itees 
and/or shrubs, of a value 1n excess of One· 
WurmlinFt, analor.properfYwhic'h was jointly 
ousand Doilers ($1,000). ·the prop~ of Eric 
. . . 
ed byEiic Wuntjlinger and1heDefcrulant,. where 
Eric Wunnlinger did not._gi-ve the Defendant pc · ssion 10 irijuzy or- destrQy _sucb. :.proporty, ~l of 
.SECOND :A.MBNDED :J:ltlf.ORMATION·: Pag, 1 
Officer Report for Incident 1 0PF05642 
Supplemental by Det:. RL Gunderson: 
12/06/10, 7he KCPA's office wanted me to obtain a current and certified copy of 
the City of Post Falls ordinance related to Shrubs & Fences. I did obtain those 
records from Carol Fairhurst today and will provide those to the KCPA. ~he 
wording relating Shrubs & Fences was removed from the ordinance. The ordinance 
now only pertains to Fences. R~G 
12/07/10, 09:40, I wil::. be ::aking this ordinance copy to t:he KCPA t:ris a.m. RLG 
12/09/10, 16:30, I met with KCPA Barry McHugh and the Wurmlingers at the KCPA 
office. It was determined that a survey of the property is needed to verify the 
exact property line. Eric stated he would contact the company he previously had 
locate a mid property line (I.N.C. company in Post Falls). 
12/16/10, 10:48, I arrived to 212 Parkwood P::..ace. Surveyer's from I.N.C. had 
been working a couple of hours already, locating the property lines. I met with 
I.N.C. employee's, Brian Griffith & Jeff Ear::..ing. They continued working while 
Eric Wurmlinger invited me into his house. He had prepared a document indicating 
t.he heigr.t cf the tree's and the approximate amount of tree which was cut. He 
numbered the tree's in his report:, one through ten, indicating each of the 
affected tree's, cou.~ting from east to west in direction. He also provided me 
with a list of names of those who could verify that it was Dwight Greenfield whc 
was assisting Chris Greenfield on the Easter weekend, 2010, by hau::..ing loads of 
cut shrubs in his pickup truck. Those persons are: 
l l Joe Malloy 
2) 
3 l }\.shley Evans 
another neighbor could also verify the approximate height of the cut: tree's, 
prior to the incident. her name is Ash::..ey Labau •••••••• , I asked Eric to 
fax a copy of that: document to the PFPD for me. 
The survey was completed at about 11::5 am, about the time Chris Greenfield 
exited her house. The crew set up a ~ine to show the exact points of the 
property line. I Photographed the line to try to accurately show where that line 
was located. Chris Greenfield was also present taking photos from her side of 
the property and made it clear that nobody was to cross over onto her property. 
All persons respected her property rights without crossing onto her side. 
I returned to the PFPD and not:.ified Barry Mchugh of the results o:: the survey 
and provided some photos which accurately depict t:.he scene. Eric Wumlinger had 
been billed $450.00 for the line marking, a cost which the KCPA/ PFPD had agreed 
to pay to have this boundary line identified. RLG 
12/21/10, 13:18, I called and ::..eft:. a voice message for Ashley Evans, requesting 
he return my phone call. 
12/21/10, 13:20, I called and spoke to Ashley Labau regarding her observations. 
She said they lived on the opposite side of Chris Greenfield at 208 Parkwood 
Place, and moved out about March, 2009. She said Chris had commented about her 
intentions of cutting down the row of trees during a conversation with her. She 
said Chris told her the trees were blocking her view. Ashley said they moved out 
of the neighborhood before the trees were cut down. She did see them after they 
were cut, and verified that several feet of the trees was cut off. 
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I 
Christina J. Greenfield 
210 S. Parkwood Place 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
Phone: (208) 773-0400 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ERIC J. WURMLINGER an 
ROSALYNND. WURMLINGER 








) _________________ ) 
DATED this 19th day ofNovember, 2012 
CASE NO. CV-10 -8209 
PLAINTIFF AMENDED 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM AND 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CHRISTINA J. GREENFIELD, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ERIC J. WURMLINGER, 











Case No. CV 10-8209 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
WE, THE JURY, answer the special interrogatories as follows: 
Question No. 1: Does the Defendants' operation of the Rivercove Bed and Breakfast violate the 
Parkwood Place Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&R's)? 
Answer to Question No. 1: Yes __ No __ _ 
Question No. 2: Have Defendants planted tall growing arborvitae shrubs on or near the property 
line between the Plaintiff's real property and the Defendants' real property? 
Answer to Question No. 2: Yes ___ No __ 
Question No. 3: Does the arborvitae hedge constitute a fence? 
Answer to Question No. 3: Yes __ No __ 
Question No. 4: Have Defendants arborvitae shrubs grown in excess of that which is allowed 
by the Parkwood Place Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&R' s )? 
Answer to Question No. 4: Yes ___ No __ 
Question No. 5: Did the Defendants obstruct and / or block the Parkwood Place pedestrian 
easement? 
Answer to Question No. 5: Yes ___ No __ 
Question No. 6: Do the Defendants shrubs and / or trees block the Plaintiff's view of the 
Spokane river and obstruct the Plaintiff's free use of property? 
Answer to Question No. 6: Yes ___ No __ 
Question No. 7: Did the actions of the Defendants planting of trees and / or shrubs obscuring 
the Plaintiffs view result in the reduction in the value of her real property? 
Answer to Question No. 7: Yes ___ No __ _ 
Question No. 8: Did the Defendants refusal to maintain the arborvitae hedge constitute a 
nuisance? 
Answer to Question No. 8: Yes No --- ---
Question No. 9: Did the Defendants operation of the Rivercove Bed and Breakfast constitute a 
nuisance? 
Answer to Question No. 9: Yes No --- ---
Question No. 10: Did the Defendants operation of the Rivercove Bed and Breakfast interfere 
with the comfortable enjoyment of Plaintiffs comfortable enjoyment of life and property? 
Answer to Question No. 10: Yes ___ No __ _ 
Question No. 11: Did the Defendants' falsely report a crime and accuse the Plaintiff of 
Malicious Irtjury to Property for trimming the arborvitae hedge? 
Answer to Question No. 11: Yes ___ No __ _ 
Question No. 12: Did the Defendants' intentionally-and/ or recklessly make other false 
accusations to law enforcement about the Plaintiff? 
Answer to Question No. 12: Yes No --- ---
Question No. 13: Did the Defendants' engage in a course of conduct to harass the Plaintiffl 
Answer to Question No. 13: Yes ___ No __ _ 
Question No. 14: Were the Defendants actions negligent, and if so, was this negligence a direct 
and proximate cause of Plaintiffs damages? 
Answer to Question No. 14: Yes ___ No __ _ 
Question No. 15: Were the Defendants actions negligent, and if so, was this negligence a direct 
and proximate cause of Plaintiffs emotional distress? 
Answer to Question No. 15: Yes ___ No __ _ 
Question No. 16: What is the total amount of damage sustained by the Plaintiffs as a result of 
her damages: 
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JUST ADD WATER 
Your wallet is a bit lighter from my 
purchase & your back may be tired 
from digging holes, but the hard 
pact is ovc.r & our inve cmcm of 
time & money alrady looks great, 
However, there is one more critical 
task - a deep, thorough weekly 
watering is cucmial, cspco:i..Lly 
during hot, dry period . My roots 
take 2..bouc a year ro gro and 
re~ ubli.sh in my new home. 
The key to m survival is to make 
sure enough arer pcnCtraI the 
borrom of my rom zone. l would 
re:tlly bcnefa from :i. akcr hose & 
few inches of mulch ro prcvc:nt my 
roo from drying out & co en urc 
my continued w:ccss. 




nJ y outdoor adi iti 
In a natural and private 
en ironm na. 
CONFIDENTIAL BENCH MEMORANDUM 
Greenfield v. Wurmlinger, et al. 
CV 10-8209 
PARTIES: 
Plaintiff: Christina Greenfield 
Defendants: Eric and Rosalynd Wurmlinger (husband and wife) 
ATTORNEYS: 
Plaintiff: Pro Se 
Defendants: .John Riscborough and Trevor Frank 
1·i. Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Judgment; 
: 2. Plaintiff's Motion .Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV) 
I. Introduction 
In her Complaint Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant ("Greenfield") asserted legal claims 
for nuisance and negligent infliction of emotional distress. as well as equitable claims praying for 
injunctive and abatement relief In their Counterclaim, the Defendants/Counterclaimants 
("Wurmlingers") asserted legal claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, trespass and 
ti m bcr trespass. 
On November 26. 2012, a five-day jury trial commenced in this matter as to the legal 
claims asserted by the parties, with the Court reserving Greenfield's equitable claims for 
determination by court trial. Greenfield was represented pro se and the Wurmlingers were 
represented by attorney John C. Riseborough. 
On November 30, 2012, the jury returned a special verdict in favor of the Wurrnlingers 
on each of Greenfield's claims, and found in favor of the Wurmlingers on their counterclaims. 
As to Greenfield's claims, the jury found that the Wunnlingers' maintenance of their arborvitae 
and/or operation of their bed and breakfast did not constitute nuisances. Additionally, the jury 
it 1, I r· 1.df--1, (/~ \ 
£~,(tLElJ1 f' / 6/"JS) 
found that the Wurmlingers had not inflicted emotional distress upon Greenfield. As to the 
Wurmlingers' counterclaims, the jury found that Greenfield had committed trespass, but did not 
award trespass damages. Additionally. the jury found that the arborvitae were trees and that 
Greenfield committed timber trespass. The jury awarded the Wurmlingers timber trespass 
damages in the amount of $17,000.00. Lastly, the jury found that Greenfield's general conduct 
negligently inflicted emotional distress on the Wurmlingers, and that the negligence was the 
proximate cause of the Wurmlingers' damages. The jury awarded the Wurrnlingers negligent 
infliction of emotional distress damages in the amount of $52,000.00. 
On December l 0, 2012, Greenfield filed her Motion to Set Aside .Judgment Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the VerdicL and the Affidavit of Christina Greenfield. On December 
2 L 20 I 2. the Wurm I ingers filed their opposition brief. On January 7. 2012, this Court entered its 
Order Establishing Post Jury Trial Judgment and its Jury Trial Judgment. On January 14. 2012, 
Greenfield filed her reply brief. 
Greenfield's motions came on for hearing on January 16. 2013, and after hearing 
argumenL the Court took the motions under advisement. 
II. Summarv of Arguments 
Greenfield has brought her Motion to Set Aside the Judgment pursuant to l.R.C.P. 60( a) 
and (b), and her Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict pursuant to l.R.C.P. 50(6). In 
general, Greenfield argues, "Plaintiff believes that the jury would have formulated a different 
opinion if they hadn't been tricked into believing that the arborvitae hedge was solely owned by 
the Defendants', a decision that was based on the admission of the Defendants' deceitful 
survey." Plaintiff's Motions at p. 22. 
Argument O[mosition Rep!" Analvsis 
1. JNOV: Constitutional and Procedurally, I note that 
Wurmlingers statutory Greenfield requests that the 
2 
fV. Analvsis 
The only issue that concerns me is the NIED claim being dismissed. We can play up the 
fonner counsel's decision and the no objection to putting it to the jury later on. 
As to reserving ruling on the Motion to Set Aside Judgment. the CC&R issue does relate 
to the court trial but there is a judgment entered on the other issues. Will have to ask her about 
that at the hearing. Also. need to hear about NIED counterclaim dismissal issue. 
Camphell. supra. discusses fraud upon the court. 
Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to 
suppo1i a conclusion: it is more than a scintilla. hut less than a preponderance." Evans,·. ffara's. 
Inc., 123 Idaho 473,478. 849 P.2d 934. 939 (1993) ( citation omitted l. 
As to the NIED claim. the ISC provided in Belstler v. Conine: 
B. The district court did not err in enjoining the Belstlers from relocating the private driveway 
easement. 
1. The district court had jurisdiction to decide this issue. 
The Belstlers argue that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction w enjoin any 
rights pursuant to J.C. § 55-313 to relocate an easement found to exist by the court in its 
decision. They argue that the relocation issue was not pied or argued before the district court. and 
that although they pled relocation in their complaint, their amended complaint no longer referred 
to relocation as an issue. Additionally, they argue that there was no explicit reference to J.C. § 
5 5-313 at trial, and that they did not agree to have the relocation issue decided at trial. Further. 
any references at trial to relocation, they argue referred to settlement and mediation offers. 
The December 30, 2009 Memorandum Decision stated that the: 
[P]aiiies did extensively litigate the relocation issue at trial and the pleadings are deemed 
amended to include a claim for relocation of the northerly easement. Throughout the trial the 
parties took the position that if the court should determine that the easements claimed by the 
CONINES are valid easements, the Court should then determine whether or not the 
BELSTLERS could, pursuant to I.C. § 55-313 change the location of the northerly easement. 
Therefore. that issue is ripe for detennination at this time by this Court. 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule l 5(b J states in relevant pan that: 
9 
